

# **Profiles of Political Elites in India**

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## Foreword

As in other democracies, political leaders are central to the functioning of the Indian political system. They articulate and define the goals that must animate and stimulate the system. They also set in motion strategies of mobilizing support for realizing these goals. Crucial to all this is the extent to which free, open and healthy competition for acquiring control of power apparatus of society takes place among political leaders. Through this process of competition, political leaders create, sustain and invigorate an institutional structure that embodies essential values either reflected in the social system itself or those that must be created if it lacks them for successfully navigating the Ark of the State in troublous waters.

Political elites play all these roles in a democratic polity. However, these roles acquire greater significance in a polity whose acquaintance with democratic institutions and processes is very recent and where democratic rules of the game have not yet become firm. In such a situation political leaders have not only to articulate appropriate values, but also to reflect them in their activities as well as to successfully propagate them in the people. Thus the responsibility of political leaders in a new democracy is tremendously enhanced. Constituting as they do a very crucial link between the mass of the people still enmeshed in traditional ways of thinking and acting and modern political institutions based on universal considerations, they have to discharge their responsibilities in a way that not

only brings the two orders into close contact but also shapes their interaction appropriately to make the realization of the systematic goals possible.

How capable are political leaders in India to discharge this responsibility? This is a question that must be answered in order to evaluate the functioning of democratic institutions in India. No doubt this question has increasingly engaged the attention of the students of Indian politics. However, very few studies exist to date to throw ample light on this question. It is the merit of *Profiles of Political Elites in India* by Dr. V.B. Singh that it confronts this question in its manifold aspects. It deals with socio-political profiles of political leaders, traces the contours of their career patterns, examines their value commitments and probes into their adherence to certain democratic norms. Thus by placing the phenomenon of political elites against a wider canvass, Dr. Singh succeeds in building a composite picture of political leaders in India that goes a long way in helping us find answer to the question posed earlier.

*Profiles of Political Elites in India* is an important contribution to the growing literature on Indian political system. I am sure, students of Indian politics will benefit quite a lot from this book.

Delhi

Ramashray Roy

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## Introduction

In every society—traditional or modern, backward or advance, monolithic or plural—there are always few individuals who are ranked high on variety of indicators subject to the norms and values prevalent in the society. Depending upon the social order of the community, individuals belonging to this group distinguish themselves from the commoners, have more assets (material and non-material) at their command, wield greater power, enjoy more respect, and, by and large, are better placed on socio-economic indicators than the rest of the lot. These individuals in common social science parlance are known as elite in the society.

The term 'elite' has several referents, e.g. knowledge processing, decision-making, guiding, etc. But more than a status or stratification concept, it is a role concept. Meaningful distinction among national elites is possible according to the nature of activities they are engaged in, e.g. political, educational, bureaucratic, religious and so on. Throughout our analysis, unless otherwise specified, we have used the term 'elite' in a specific sense of political elites who are also referred to as political or civic leaders<sup>1</sup>. They encompass both

1 David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 139; see also Robert A. Dahl, *Modern Political Analysis* (New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India Private Limited, 1965), pp. 16-18.

stratification as well as control referents, a societal sub-units as well as the leadership qualities. Though for a lack of better term we have used the term 'elite' interchangeably with political leaders, it is not to be confused with the term 'elitist', for elitism is a dimension of elites but not a part of their definition.

In any sphere of social life existence of such individuals is bound to be there; only forms and functions may vary. Leadership of a group, organization, community, or of a nation comes from this privileged group. Becoming a leader is a consequence of needs of a group of people and conditions within which that group operates. In words of Bavelas, "a person who can assist or facilitate the group most in reaching a satisfactory state is most likely to be regarded as leader."<sup>2</sup> And thus, in the same group, the leadership can very well change depending upon the nature of the problem and the condition in which it may arise. But it does not mean that every individual member of the group has an equal chance of leading the group. Even though the changes may occur in leadership positions i.e. different people may occupy leadership position at different times, accessibility to these positions are limited to those who possess leadership attributes. What are these characteristics and which individuals have the access to the leadership positions are the questions we intend to deal with at a later stage; however, one thing that emerges here is that the number of such individuals is always limited compared to the rest of the population in any setting.

Despite the fact that the elites constitute a very insignificant proportion in reference to that of the total citizenry, the universe is unwieldy—too large for any one who intends to include all varieties of elite in a single study. In fact, there could be as many varieties of elite as there are activities in which one set of people or the other participates. It is obvious, however, that not all such elites will play an equally important part in the larger affairs of a society,

2. A. Bavelas, "Leadership: Man and Function," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, vol. 5, 1960, pp. 491-8; reproduced in C.A. Gibb ed., *Leadership; Selected Readings* (Penguin Books, 1969) pp. 17-24.

particularly the political ones.<sup>3</sup> We may, therefore, safely classify elites, after Pareto, into two major categories: political elites and non-political elites.<sup>4</sup> Here we will deal with political elites for obvious reasons. The political elites, who have direct access to political power, or directly participate in decision-making process or the process of governance are thus put in an advantageous position of influence over other segments of social life and hence occupy an important place in the society<sup>5</sup>. To be more precise, in a democratic polity, where political parties serve as institutional means for political aspirants to enter into politics, the members and leaders of these organizations constitute political leadership of the country who, in most cases, lead the society and engage in nation-building activities.

Political parties, in any competitive polity, serve as catalytic agents of its growth and development. They act as powerful links between the people and government on the one hand, and foster changes in the society for the attainment of polity's goals on the other. The immediate objective of parties, as Duverger puts it, is to gain power or to participate in the exercise of powers<sup>6</sup>. In addition, the political parties play quite an interesting part in educating the masses, particularly, in the area of political modernization, articulation of interests and grievances of the people, integrating individuals and wide varieties of socio-cultural groups into the mainstream of national life, bridging communication gaps within and between societies, and contributing to the growth and development of the nation in various other respects of the nation's socio-political life.<sup>7</sup>

3. Geraint Parry, *Political Elites; Studies in Political Science* (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1969), p. 68.
4. For other types of classification see *Ibid.*, pp. 64-94; and T.B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (Pelican Books, 1966), pp. 7-20.
5. Yogendra Singh, *Modernization of Indian Tradition* (Delhi: Thomson Press (India) Limited, 1973), p. 131.
6. Maurice Duverger, *The Idea of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society*, (London: Methuen and Company Limited, 1966), p. 105.
7. See also Angela S. Burger, *Opposition in a Dominant Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India*, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 3.

The role of political parties is particularly crucial in new democracies. In India—a nascent polity,—which ranks much low in respect of many of the indicators of modernization such as channels of mass-media communication, means of transportation, levels of literacy, etc., the political parties, leaders, and political workers shoulder much greater responsibilities in bridging such obvious gaps. The parties and leaders, particularly the lower level political activists, are instrumental in training responsive citizenry which is of vital significance for sustenance and development of democratic system. In a decentralized five-tier Indian federal polity i.e. Centre-State-District-Block-and Village Panchhyat, where major political parties, more or less, also function in a similar organizational structure (for instance, the political parties also maintain their organizational structure on the lines of administrative divisions) the importance of lower level political activists assume greater significance primarily because they live with the people and work for and with them throughout the year. The case of the party chiefs and higher level leaders is, however, quite different from those who are located at the lower levels. Except at the time of elections, they (the higher level leaders) get very little time for constituency level work. These leaders, by and large, spend most of their time and energy in formulating party-goals and strategies and provide directives to their counterparts at the lower levels.

In a plural society with multi-party system like India, several political parties operate simultaneously and compete with each other. For the attainment of their primary goal i.e. control over power, each of the parties propagates its ideology and programme, criticises its opponents and tries to mobilize people and bring them in its fold. Although the under-current of such activities are there throughout the period between elections, they are accelerated shortly before and during the elections. Moreover, it is during election, particularly the general election, that we see the best of all the parties and leaders. The political parties try to put their 'best' in the form of candidates, campaign organizers and try to win over important public figures to their side. Thus, the leadership which forms the part of election politics constitutes an important segment

of the leadership in general. To be more precise, the leadership which works actively in the election and that which emerges during the election and performs crucial role in it, inevitably assumes larger significance in running the affairs of the nation.

Therefore, in order to acquire better understanding of any polity the study of its leadership assumes greater meaning and significance. It is rightly suggested by Lasswell and others that, "the leadership of a society is criterion of values by which that society lives. ... By learning the nature of the elite, we learn much about the nature of the society".<sup>8</sup> Leadership plays an instrumental role in every transition that takes place in a society.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the shape of things to come also depends largely on the forms and types of leadership prevailing in the society. Thus, the leadership of a polity at any given point of time can be likened to a three dimensional mirror. The first dimension gives an idea about its political antecedents; the central piece provides an understanding of the present state of affairs; and the third dimension would give leads into the future, that is, what the society would look like tomorrow and the day after if the leadership is what it is today.

### Theoretical Considerations

One of the most essential components of democracy is its representational nature. How representative the system is, in fact, an indicator of the 'democraticness' of the polity. That is, the extent of democracy or the democraticness of a system would largely depend on the representative character of its leadership. Ideally speaking, all representational forms of government, by and large, claim to be 'government of the people, for the people, and by the people'. However, the

8. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Eastern Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 1.

9. For a detailed treatment of the subject, see Harold D. Lasswell, "The Study of Political Leaders" in Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 3-23.



truthfulness of such assertions cannot be taken on their face value. For example, all theories based on elitist model deny that there can be, in any real sense, government by the people. They agree on the formulation that government in a democratic system is certainly of the people, it may even be for the people, but it can never be by the people because for them government is in fact by the 'ruling class',<sup>10</sup> Such theorists generally contend that the appearance of democratic majority control over the rule of the minority (that comes through representation) is always deceptive. Moreover, "the undemocratic character of representative government becomes most apparent when the representative principle is applied in a system of indirect election, whereby an elected elite itself elects a second elite which is endowed with equal or superior political power."<sup>11</sup> According to the elitist theory of democracy, the minority with its power positions can always manipulate the electoral process for its own ends, e.g., in a democratic system one of the most cherished values, the participation of the masses in the exercise of choice between the rival leaders. itself does not remain purely democratic because the masses have obviously no option but to choose from the list that has been provided by the political parties. And thus, "the sovereign electorate will 'choose' its leaders from those acceptable to the elite."<sup>12</sup>

This is an elitist way of looking at democracy and democratic institutions. Democracy, by virtue of its competitiveness and openness, involves the whole society even if only indirectly and marginally. Mosca, a great critic of popular sovereignty, who calls the 'will of the people' a 'Rousseauistic myth' argues in his later works that "while acknowledging the fact that a governing elite is necessary in every society, the distinctive feature of democracy, as a form of government, is that it permits elites to form freely, and establishes a regulated competition between elites for the

10. For details see Bottomore, *op. cit.* (Chapter VI); and Parry, *op. cit.* (Chapter 1).

11. Bottomore, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

12. Parry, *op. cit.* p. 31.

positions of power."<sup>13</sup> But how far would the competition between parties and elites alone suffice to ensure democracy? An elitist would perhaps readily accept that it is sufficient. Some liberal thinkers may also support this view, or "...would at least regard the competition between elites as being so important as to absolve them from further inquiry into the conditions of democracy."<sup>14</sup> However, for most of the pluralists it can never be regarded as a sufficient condition for the development of a healthy democracy. As Bottomore argues :

...the preservation, and especially the development and improvement, of a democratic system of government does not depend primarily upon fostering the competition between small elite groups whose activities are carried on in realms far removed from the observation or control of ordinary citizens, but upon creating and establishing the conditions in which a large majority of citizens, if not all citizens, can take part in deciding those social issues which vitally affect their individual lives—at work, in the local community, and in the nation—and in which the distinction between elites and masses is reduced to the smallest possible degree.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, the competition between parties and leaders for representing the people can never be representative in its truer sense until and unless the representatives are in a strict sense 'representatives' of the governed mass. That is to say that the governing elites (the leaders) should be representative of the wide segments of the society and their vital concerns, irrespective of their own socio-economic background.

These two conditions, i.e. competition and representative-ness, form the core concern of any democratic theory. But, of course, differences about their relative significance exist.

13. Bottomore, *op. cit.* p. 112.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 126; see also Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1960), pp. 45-52; and James H. Meisel, *The Myth of the Ruling Class* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958).

Scholars engaged in studying social background of political leaders emphasise that the political leadership ought to be recruited from wide segments of society for the viability of the democratic polity. Others hold that more crucial a question is that the leadership should be sensitized to the concerns of the people. There seems to be a great deal of overlap between these two claims. It is quite logical that the leaders belonging to a group or section would understand the needs and problems of their constituents much better than the outsiders. The representation needs understanding and understanding, in turn, is facilitated with familial and other associations with the constituents and for this reason one might give greater weightage to the former claim. Perhaps Duverger is guided by this consideration when he writes that "the formula 'government of the people, by the people' must be replaced by this formula : 'government of the people by an elite sprung from the people.'"<sup>16</sup> Or, Lasswell's formulation that "leaders must be drawn from the community at large, rather than from a few strata,"<sup>17</sup> is an argument in support of the former claim. In support of the latter claim i.e. the representatives must represent the concerns of the people, one may suggest that belongingness is desirable but not a necessary condition for the understanding of a group and its interests. An outsider can also understand if he has interest in it and can effectively represent the group. And thus, anybody with knowledge of the people's problem and concern for the well-being of the society in general, can represent them as well. For instance. J.S. Mill was not a woman nor Gandhi a Harijan. But not everybody can be a Mill or Gandhi. Then, what is required is that the representatives must be drawn, as far as possible, from varied segments of society. But they must feel close to the people and be adequately concerned with their well-being.<sup>18</sup> In view of this,

16. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (English ed., London: Methuen Press, 1954) p. 425.

17. Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1948), p. 109.

18. See Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. I, 1950, pp. 1-16 and 126-42; see also Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, 1952, pp. 357-75.

if one desires to understand the dynamics of leadership and its representative character in a given system, one can, under no circumstances, do away with either of the two measures indicated above; one has to apply both these tests simultaneously. On this one would agree with Kuroda that "central to any empirical test of the extent of democracy is the concept of representation, or the extent to which a government or political leadership in a political system represents the will of the people."<sup>19</sup> Testing the extent of representativeness is important because despite the fact that leadership recruitment process had been quite open, yet not everybody has the access to such positions for obvious reasons. In western democracies, even today, we find that the representatives are still recruited predominantly from the upper strata of society, and have an elitist view of the masses.<sup>20</sup>

### The Problem

Broadly speaking, we are interested in looking at Indian leadership from this perspective. Leadership in India, which was predominantly ascriptive in nature at various levels in the pre-Independence period, has experienced some changes in the post-independence period,<sup>21</sup> particularly after the introduction of universal adult franchise. But the gains were marginal because the upper and middle classes with greater access to societal resources took full advantage of the newly formed system and accordingly these classes changed their *modus operandi* from old to new. In most cases persons occupying different traditional power positions did not change, only the names and forms of such positions have changed, e.g. the age-old system of MUKHIA—the traditional head of the village—

19. Yasumasa Kuroda, "Psychological Aspects of Community Power Structure: Leaders and Rank-and-File Citizens in Reet Town, Japan," in Charles M. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark and Robert L. Lineberry (eds), *Community Politics: A Behavioral Approach* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 237.
20. See W.L. Guttman, *The British Political Elite* (London: Mac-Gibbon, and Kee, 1963) Chapter XI.
21. See Singh, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-40.

became president of the village Panchayat.<sup>22</sup> One of the prime reasons that Community Development Programme and Panchayati Raj did not make any major headway can be attributed to this.<sup>23</sup> At the other end of the spectrum, studies conducted on Indian Parliamentarians have shown that people from upper strata of the society are overwhelmingly represented in the House of People. These studies also show that the leadership structure in the country is undergoing change albeit very slowly. Governmental efforts through legislation e.g. reservation of seats for Scheduled castes and Scheduled tribes in both elective as well as administrative bodies, protection and promotion of down-trodden people in various social and economic spheres i.e. education, land reform, etc. have not gone completely waste. Moreover, the forces of political modernization, industrialization and currents and cross-currents sprouting from various socio-economic factors, such as relative deprivation and regional imbalance, etc., have given birth to very many new interests and pressure groups and enabled the participation of increasingly growing numbers in the affairs of nation and its socio-political life. Most of such groups have ultimately made necessary the formation of new political parties, usually minor and/or parochial. All these were quite instrumental in bringing new groups of people into the mainstream of national politics. And through these processes many changes have occurred in the Indian political leadership structure and their outlook.

This explains the diversity in the support bases of various political parties and consequently the distribution of relevant resources. Thus, greater the diversity in regard to sources of

22. Although, this aspect of change in the leadership structure is not studied systematically, there exists a fair amount of evidence in Narain *et al's* study of rural elite to show that "upper castes command greater resource potential and thereby wield greater political influence than the lower castes in panchayati raj hierarchy." Iqbal Narain, K.C. Pande and Mohan Lal, *Rural Elite and Elections in an Indian State* (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1976), p. 41.

23. See United Nations Study, *Community Development and Economic Development* (Bangkok, UNESCO, 1960).

support, affiliation, loyalty, and training greater is the chance of broad based political leadership and an equitable allocation of resources. This also serves as a guarantee that all the societal resources are not monopolized by one or two social segments, while other segments starve. Looked at from this perspective, while parties like Indian National Congress, Socialists, and Communists are formed on broader perspectives pertaining to national socio-economic conditions, there are a large number of parties which are organised mainly on the basis of communal, regional and local issues and interests. In such a situation when one witnesses diverse basis of party formation one would also expect that they would accordingly enhance the avenues of political participation and mobilize the relatively unmobilized sections of society to the realm of public affairs and politics.

Moreover, processes of alignment and re-alignment of political forces, particularly in the form of splits, mergers, and alliances within and between parties add a new dimension to the understanding of the problem of political leadership in India. As it is, score of political parties have come on the political scene during the last two-and-a-half decades of our experiences of parliamentary democracy, but very few of these have been able to sustain themselves. In fact, most of these parties raised their banner during one election or the other and vanished just after the election having failed either to capture a sizeable electoral support or to exist independently. The parties like Hindu Maha Sabha, Rama Rajya Parishad, Scheduled Caste Federation, Krishikar Lok Party, Bolshevik Party of India, Tamil Nad Toilers etc. provide very good examples of such parties. Similarly, the Socialist parties provide an excellent example of the phenomenon of splits and mergers. The Congress party, on the other hand, served as mother institution for the formation of various political parties both during pre-and post-independent India.

Although the phenomenon of split and splintering away of a group of people from a party and forming a new political group or party has tended to cause instability and uncertainty in the functioning of the system at times, it has also played a

useful role in mobilizing the people and, has, in effect, expanded the base of political recruitment and increased citizen-inputs in democratic processes. That is, whenever a new group was formed it was able to attract at least some new section or group to their fold and had thus widened the spectrum of political participation and thereby involved groups of people who were hitherto indifferent to politics in general.

In this background the historic split in the Congress party in 1969, the dissolution of the Parliament in December 1970 and seeking of a fresh mandate by the then Prime Minister of India were the major watersheds of national significance. The 1969 split in the Congress and the development that followed were of a larger significance. The 1971 Parliamentary elections were held in a much different socio-political context compared to those held previously. On the one hand, it witnessed a beginning of polarization process of political parties. That is, parties of diverse interests, viz., Congress (O), Swatantra, Jana Sangh and S.S.P. came to an understanding on the need to fight against the then Prime Minister and her party at the national level for the first time. On the other hand, Mrs. Gandhi and her allies tried to project the issues concerning national politics in the form of a fight between 'old' and 'young'; between progressive and conservative; between change and status-quo; and between socialism and free enterprise. And the whole of these were summed into a slogan—'garibi hatao' (remove poverty) by the supporters of the then Prime Minister and a crusade against authoritarianism by the parties opposed to her.

All these issues gave a new complexion to the competitive character of Indian politics, particularly in the area of making appeals to different socio-economic groups. How broad or narrow effect these appeals have had on minds of the voters, in general, and the leadership stratum, in particular, is a question which needs examination. In other words, as we have already seen that over a period of time bases of political participation have widened and political parties have been quite instrumental in mobilizing wide segments of society, it would be of great interest to see the impact of these processes on the formation

of leadership of the country. That is, how broad-based has the leadership become after two and a half decades of democratic politics? And what inferences can one draw from the direction of such changes in the composition of parties and the leadership? One of the prime concerns of the present study is to explore this aspect of our national leadership.

If entry into politics is facilitated through political mobilization it is socialization which determines one's sensitivity to respond to the forces of mobilization. Moreover, the socialization plays an unequal role in shaping the leader's personality, outlook and abilities to cope with diverse and complex situations to which he has to constantly respond throughout his political career. Socialization is an ongoing process which never ceases. The same is the case with political socialization. Political socialization, like socialization in general, starts in the family, passes through socio-cultural milieu and political environment and accordingly inculcates political activism in the leader. Conversely, it may impede the formation of activism. Political career as a life-cycle is grounded in political socialization and training of leaders. More often than not traits acquired through political socialization differ from those acquired earlier. And being immediate, they may probably prove more vital in determining the leader's way of thinking and mode of behaviour in actual politics. This is our second concern which we would particularly deal with in the present study.

Thirdly, our interest lies in knowing the viability of Indian system. It is important particularly, when the system is passing through a most trying situation for the last one decade. That is to say that during the last few years demands and pressures on the system have considerably increased. Some very fundamental issues concerning the goals for the future have been raised. For instance, need for more socialism, more democratization, more decentralization and questions like peace and national integration etc. have been the issues confronting the leadership. Further more, the challenges before the leadership are still greater when they are required to act under pressures and cross-pressures. In order to foster



change in a desired direction and to realize societal goals, radical measures need to be taken but not at the cost of democratic rights; the country need to be moved in a new direction but not in an authoritarian manner. To deal with all these trying situation effectively, the leadership position must be occupied by those who evince skill, initiative, imagination and, over and above, a value system propitious for proper development. All these are important and must be thoroughly examined. For the purpose of this study, we focus on three important dimensions. First, we propose to examine political leadership in terms of faith it has in the existing system. Second, we deal with the views they hold and stand they take on various issues of larger significance. And, finally, we propose to examine the model the leadership adheres to, particularly relating to peoples' participation in decision-making, power distribution and priority in resolving local versus national problem in paving the way for national development.

Over and above the concerns listed above, we shall also try to explore the observable gaps between the leaders and the led. In other words, in addition to socio-economic and demographic characteristics, the intention is to examine the similarity and dissimilarity between the views and opinions of the leaders and that of the people they lead on some of the major issues facing the system e.g. radical measures to reduce economic disparity and social inequality, legitimacy of the system, decentralization and curbs on democratic rights to get rapid economic development.

### **Outline of the present inquiry**

The study is divided into six chapters. We discuss socio-economic and demographic profiles of party activists and political leaders in Chapter II. While describing the social profile of leaders we examine social bases of different political parties. Chapter III deals with political socialization of leaders and their career patterns with a special reference to mobility and achievement in politics. We also examine in this chapter relative significance of leader's social background and his

experience in politics in influencing advancement in political career.

In chapters IV and V we undertake a discussion of the political system in its various aspects. Our concern in these two chapters is mainly exploratory and deals with leaders' faith in the system, their sense of efficacy and the effect these have on their stand on various national issues *vis-a-vis* their party affiliation. While dealing with leaders we also try to draw some comparison between the leaders and the cross-section on some aspects for which the data are available. And, finally, in Chapter VI we gather the various strands of our analysis and try to present an integrated picture of the leadership and its implication for sustenance and development of the democratic system.

## **Social Profile and Party Affiliation**

Recruitment pattern of leadership is one of the most crucial factors in shaping any system of governance. 'Who rules and how', are the two sides of the same coin and the interface between the two has inseparable bearings on each other. By knowing the nature and structure of the leadership one can easily have a feel of the system of government. We generally differentiate monarchy, aristocracy and democracy from each other just by virtue of the knowledge of the number of persons holding power i.e. 'one, few, and many' respectively. Similarly, by acquiring a fair amount of understanding of those 'one, few, and many' one can further differentiate tyranny from monarchy, oligarchy from aristocracy and mob-rule from democracy. All such distinctions are based primarily on the knowledge of people who govern. Even democracy, which is defined as a government 'of the people, by the people, and for the people', may have an overlay of aristocracy and/or tyranny depending upon the political structure a given society possesses.<sup>1</sup> While instances of

1. For greater details see V.O. Key, Jr. *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1959), pp. 3-14.

tyranny and aristocracy can never be overruled, democracy is considered to be the best form of government. For, it expects participation from the people who elect their rulers, can on occasions censor the deeds of their rulers, and can very well reject or re-elect their representatives. In a little more stricter sense a "democratic government, although controls, is itself controlled."<sup>2</sup> Or, to put it differently, in a democratic set-up the ruler is accountable to the public. And "to be accountable is to be influenced."<sup>3</sup> Over and above all this, there exists competition among various components of the social order for control over power. And thus, democracy provides, if not equal, a fairly good deal of chance to everybody to acquire power positions and participate in the decision-making processes.

Indian democracy, which does not have a long history, is still in its infancy and, owing to this, the democratic leadership, institutions, and power structure have not yet crystallized to the extent of institutionalization of democratic norms and values. The leadership which took over from the 'colonial masters' was not a representative one in the strict sense of the term and yet the changes that have taken place in the composition of the leadership during the last few decades are quite remarkable and vouch for its healthier sustenance in the future. Western educated urban middle class, which formed the core of the Indian leadership just after the independence, underwent a gradual change with the introduction of universal franchise. Panchayati Raj institutions have further strengthened the process of recruiting leadership from wider segments of society. The emergence of a wide range of political parties (though only few of them could survive)<sup>4</sup>—the left and right,

2. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

3. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C.E. Rothwell (eds.), *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1952), p. 11.

4. Over a period of five general elections more than 150 political parties appeared on the national political horizon and not more than 20 could really sustain themselves in all the elections. For  
(Contd. on next page).

local and trans—local, regional and national, and religious and communal—provided such bases as to attract individuals mostly from sections which were hitherto not so mobilized politically. That is, the role played by political parties in democratizing the political institutions are of immense significance. In fact, in democracies the gap between the people and the government is bridged by political parties. These parties, while competing among themselves for the control of power, always try to widen their political base by recruiting individuals from different segments of society.

Ideally, a democratic system permits everybody to take part in it. In actual practice, however, the question is whether everyone participates in it and that, too, in an equal manner. The answer to this, more often than not, is in the negative. Objectively speaking, there are hierarchies in participation and except the general level of participation at the grass-root e.g., voting, at no other level people can take part in decision-making processes in an equal manner. This is not possible,<sup>5</sup> for the number of positions through which one can participate are always fewer than the number of people wishing to participate. And subjectively too not everybody is suited to politics.<sup>6</sup> That is why we find a select group of individuals who, though in a numerical minority, dominate the leadership positions in politics. Political parties play quite an important role in mobilizing these individuals. Who are mobilized by which party? How does a party look when judged in terms of its social compositions? In other words, do parties have really

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example, in the very first general elections of 1952 as many as 83 political parties contested the election but in the second, i.e., 1957 elections the number came down to 59 only. Of this not more than two dozens were there which contested in both the elections. This itself speaks for the nature and extent of appearance and disappearance of political parties in India. See *Reports on the First and Second General Election in India*, Vol. 1 (General) (New Delhi: Election Commission of India, 1952 and 1957).

5. Whether it is desirable or not is entirely a different question.

6. J.D.B. Miller, *The Nature of Politics* (New York: Encyclopaedia Britannica Press, 1964), pp. 24-38.

to encompass different socio-economic interests in order to be able to present different political stands (issues)? And, finally, how far does each political party constitute a homogeneous group so as to differentiate itself from other parties?

While attempting to answer these questions we aim to find workable explanations to at least two larger questions; viz., degree of representativeness of Indian political parties, and factors promoting consensual nature of Indian polity. In a representative system each political party claims to be the best suited and most representative party. For a party to be considered representative, two conditions must be met: (a) recruitment should be representative i.e. different segments of society should get their representation in the composition of leadership positions in the party; and (b) it should represent the concerns and the interests of the people.<sup>7</sup> As far as the second question is concerned, we find a lot of overlap in modes of operation of different political parties and a great deal of consensus among them at least on broader issues of national political life. We are therefore forced to look for other factors responsible for them. Kothari observes a "striking similarity of social background" of different political parties and he concludes that this promotes similar views<sup>8</sup> on larger political issues. As such it is important to examine the socio-economic background of leaders and activists of different political parties. This will help us also in ascertaining whether parties with differential recruitment bases differ on ideological positions. Also, the knowledge of socio-economic characteristics of party functionaries may help us in understanding the recruitment pattern of different political parties, particularly in the context of

7. For a detailed discussion see, Yasumasa Kuroda, "Psychological Aspects of Community Power Structure: Leaders and Rank-and-File Citizens in Read Town, Japan" in Charles M. Bonjean, Terry N. Clark and Robert L. Lineberry, (eds.) *Community Politics: A Behavioural Approach* (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 237-243.

8. Rajni Kothari, "India: Opposition in a Consensual Polity," in Robert A. Dahl (ed.) *Regimes and oppositions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), P. 306.

fragmented supports structure of parties where ascriptive characteristics like caste and religion still play an important role in politics.

In order to understand the nature and character of different political parties it would be of interest to find out as to who are the leaders who make a particular party? To find answer to this question, one could simply look to the socio-economic attributes of political activists in terms of age, sex, education, occupation, income, rural-urban exposure and, of course, caste and religion of their members and activists. These attributes differentiate people from one another in any society. These are the attributes that usually tie people together and/or drive them apart. Moreover, these put together provide a contextualizing background of a person whose behaviour in turn might to some extent be anticipated. For example, a highly educated person, exposed to external influences, might have a broader perspective than a comparatively low educated person, not so exposed to external influences, and living in remote hinterland. Besides informing one's behaviour, these characteristics provide a psychic and social milieu which broadly influence the direction of one's action. Studies of leaders and parties in India show that people located at upper strata of society enjoy a disproportionate share in the leadership positions. Similarly, the Indian leadership shows an urban bias as far as recruitment to state and national legislative bodies is concerned.<sup>9</sup> How far this general picture of the Indian leadership is reflected across parties? To answer this as well as the questions raised earlier, we shall try to examine each of these attributes separately to see how they relate to different parties.

### Age and Party Affiliation

Age is an indicator of experience gained over a period of time. And as a matter of fact, experience is treated as virtue

9. See for example Angela S. Berger, *Opposition in a Dominant Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, the Praja Socialist Party, and the Socialist Party in Uttar Pradesh, India*, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1969), Table 5, p. 51.

in politics mainly because politics is a game of manipulation involving frequent and quick decisions. That is, people who are in party-politics, by and large, either have to participate directly in decision making or to influence it indirectly. Prerequisites to both are one's ability to arrive at a quick decision which needs assumption and anticipation made largely on the basis of one's experience. Apart from this factor of generational gap has of late become very important in politics. The younger generation which has emerged as an important force in Indian politics, has been pressing hard to get its due share in decision-making process in the recent years. The historic split of the Indian National Congress in 1969 and the 1971 parliamentary elections were both, in a sense, a crusade against the old i.e. the removal of old-guards from power positions and bringing in of new people congenial to radical changes in economic and socio-political life of the nation. These considerations make it necessary to look at the age structure of political leaders and activists of different parties. Table 2.1 presents this information.

Generally speaking nothing striking emerges from the data shown in table 2.1. On the contrary, proportion of cases distributed in different age categories brings out a pattern which further supports the findings of earlier studies on Indian leaders, especially the members of the Lok Sabha.<sup>10</sup> The fifth Lok Sabha elections, which were, in a sense, crusade against the old-guard reflect that this crusade did not make any headway, in as much as 17 per cent of the members elected to the fifth Lok Sabha belonged to the age category of sixty years and more. In fact, the reverse trend was set in 1967 when only 16 per cent belonged to this category as against 17, 12 and 9 per cent in the third, second, and the first Lok Sabhas

10. Satish K. Arora, "Social Background of the Fifth Lok Sabha," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 31-33, Special Number August, 1973; Ratna Dutta, "The Party Representative in the Lok Sabha", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. IV, Nos. 1-2, Annual Number, January, 1969; and S.L. Chopra and D.S.N. Chauhan, "Emerging Pattern of Political Leadership in India," *Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies*, Vol. IV, January March, 1970.



TABLE 2.1  
Age by Party Affiliation

Age	Party	INC	SWA	BJS	CPM	CPI	Socialist Parties	INC (O)	Splinter Congress Parties	DMK	Other Parties	Non-Party	Total
35 Years and below		9.7	8.1	14.0	5.9	2.8	6.2	3.2	18.5	12.5	14.8	8.7	9.5
36 to 40 years		13.3	14.3	17.4	5.9	8.3	14.6	11.8	13.0	33.3	14.8	21.7	14.2
41 to 45 years		16.8	16.3	23.3	17.6	5.6	16.7	16.1	14.8	12.5	14.8	13.1	16.4
46 to 50 years		20.2	12.2	19.8	—	41.7	25.0	33.3	18.5	20.8	14.8	17.4	21.8
51 to 55 years		14.8	24.5	12.8	47.1	19.4	16.7	15.1	14.8	12.5	14.8	21.7	16.3
56 to 60 years		12.2	10.2	5.8	5.9	13.9	18.7	10.8	7.4	8.3	7.5	4.3	10.8
More than 60 years		12.2	14.3	5.8	17.6	8.3	2.1	8.6	13.0	—	18.5	13.1	10.4
Age N.A.		0.8	—	1.2	—	—	—	1.1	—	—	—	—	0.6
Total N		352	49	86	17	36	48	93	54	24	27	23	809
%		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Age		48.6	49.4	44.3	51.3	49.5	47.8	48.7	47.2	43.1	49.1	47.6	47.9

respectively.<sup>11</sup> However, the increase between 1967 and 1971 is so insignificant that one can easily argue that new people came to the fifth Lok Sabha as against those of the third and the second Lok Sabha. Moreover, the parliament being the supreme body, slightly older leaders are more likely to be there primarily for two reasons : firstly, this is the highest legislative position a political party can offer to its members as reward for their dedication and long services ; and, secondly, once allowed to hold this position hardly any one wishes to quit and make room for the younger people. And perhaps for this reason a similar trend operates in other democracies as well.<sup>12</sup>

As far as the present study is concerned, our sample does not consist of parliamentarians alone but it also represents a cross-section of political leaders down to the assembly-constituency level leaders. As such, one should expect better representation of younger people in the sample. And one in fact finds it. For example, there are roughly 24 per cent in the age group of 'less than 40 years' and only 10.5 per cent in the age group of 'more than 60 years' (see table : 2.1) as against Arora's findings of 19 and 17 per cent respectively in the fifth Lok Sabha.<sup>13</sup> This difference, although not very striking, points to the fact that different political parties fill lower positions in the party organization as well as in legislature by younger people but give due consideration to age and experience with regard to higher positions. Pantham also notes this tendency. As against his finding that 43 per cent of the local leaders belong to the age group of 40 years and less, we have 24 per cent in our sample.<sup>14</sup>

Inter-party comparison brings out a number of interesting observations about the age structure of party activists. First of all, the Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) appears to-

11. Arora, *op. cit.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. Thomas Pantham, *Political Parties and Democratic Consensus: A Study of Party Organizations in an Indian City*; (Delhi: Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1976) Table 3.1, p. 57,

have a larger share of younger people followed by the Jana Sangh, the splinter Congress parties, the Socialists and so on (see mean age, table . 2.1). This trend, in fact, indicates two things : first, the age of the party seems to have a bearing on the age composition of its members i.e. the parties which have recently come into existence have larger number of younger people ; and, second, the parties with urban base are likely to be manned by younger people. The case of the Jana Sangh supports these conjectures. Second, the Communist parties have the largest number of older people in them. This is an indication of stricter membership policy of both these parties, of course, the CPM being the more rigid. And interestingly, our data also corroborate it (the mean age of the CPM activists is 51.3 years as against 49.5 of the CPI). The Swatantra occupies the third place (mean age 49.4 years) followed by other parties and the Congress (O)—a party of old guards, particularly in the 1971 context. The Congress occupies almost a middle rank in terms of mean age ; this give a younger look to the party. As a dominant party, it faces greater demand for promotion and has greater capacity for distribution of patronages and material incentives even at lower levels. Both these factors enable it to delay promotion of its members.<sup>15</sup>

### Sex and Party Affiliation

Any attempt to determine the sex ratio of Indian political leaders seems to be futile at least from the data we use here. For example, of the total 810 positions interviewed only 18 are held by women (2.2 per cent of the total sample). This is by no means indicative of reality as far as the role of women in Indian politics is concerned, particularly in the context when they constitute half of the total population. Added to this, their under-representation is conspicuous in a situation when the nation does not discourage a woman seeking the highest position of political power. Their proportion in parliament is a little larger than what we have in our sample. For example, in the fifth Lok Sabha, their share is

15. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

4.1 per cent as against only 2.2 per cent in our sample. It shows that their involvement in non-legislative politics is minimal. For example, of the 18 positions held by women in our sample only 4 are non-legislative positions. This perhaps explains the lesser proportion of women in our sample as against in the parliament on the one hand and their under-representation in politics in general on the other.

As far as partywise break-up of women leaders is concerned 10 of the 18 women activists belong to the Congress, two to the Congress (O), one to the Swatantra, five to other minor parties, and none to the Jana Sangh, the Communists and the Socialist parties.

In the absence of sufficient number of female respondents any fruitful analysis is not possible except to make two points. First, the role of women in politics is very uneven. Second, although they happen to acquire few positions at higher level politics, particularly the legislative ones, their participation is almost non-existent at the grass-root level, thereby indicating, as Arora observes, that alongwith other politically weaker segments women also form part of the syndrome of exclusion from political power.<sup>16</sup>

### Education and Party Affiliation

Education is considered as one of the most important indicators of modernization. In under-developed or developing countries where education, especially the higher education, is still beyond the reach of the common man, it can easily be regarded as an elite characteristic. Education usually enables one to get more respect and better reception in society than those without education. In a traditional society the fact that one is respected is enough of an inducement to get into politics and exploit it to his advantage. Moreover, it has been strongly proved and impressively documented in the literature that education facilitates one's understanding and widens one's horizon of information and awareness. Since education is

16. Arora, *op. cit.*,

also closely related to political participation the political leaders are disproportionately recruited from the better educated strata of the society.<sup>17</sup> This is perhaps what prompts Brewer to note that the Indian "political activists are not 'average' Indian citizen."<sup>18</sup> However, parties do differ from each other as far as their social bases are concerned. This is revealed in table : 2.2.

As expected more than 52 per cent of our leaders are highly educated, i.e. graduate and above. In contrast, only 0.4 per cent are illiterate. This becomes still more meaningful when compared with the general population. 70 per cent of the total population which is illiterate hardly finds a chance to enter politics, particularly in competitive politics. Except for 3 Congressites (two in Congress and one in Congress (O)) who came into politics during pre-independence period, not a single illiterate person occupies leadership position. Moreover, while only 1.2 per cent of the total population hold graduate degree and higher degrees 52.3 per cent of leaders in our sample (see table : 2.2) have graduates. This emphasizes the crucial role that education plays in the recruitment of political leaders in India.

As far as educational level of activists of different political parties is concerned, the Jana Sangh and the DMK represent two extreme positions on the literacy continuum. While the activists in both the parties manifest hundred per cent literacy, there are 70.9 per cent of leaders in the Jana Sangh who are graduates and above as against only 29.2 per cent in the DMK. The CPI occupies the second place with 63.9 per cent in the highest educational category, followed by the splinter Congress parties, the Swatantra, the Socialists, and so on. Two things are reflected in table 2.2. First, urban-based parties seem to have larger proportion of highly educated people; and, second, new parties are likely to have more

17. For a detailed documentation, see Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 122-24.

18. W. Ross Brewer, "Ideologues, Game Players, and the Future of Indian Politics," *The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, November 1976, p. 258.



educated people. Both these put together quite clearly suggest that education is increasingly influencing the process of leadership recruitment in India. This trend is further supported when leaders' educational level is tabulated against the year of their entry into party (see table 1, Appendix III).

### Occupation and Party Affiliation

Leadership composition in terms of people belonging to different occupational categories has remarkably changed over a period of time. For example, representation of agricultural occupation—the most important occupational category in India—has considerably increased: it increased roughly from one out of fifteen in the provisional parliament of 1947 to as high as one out of three in the fifth parliament of 1971.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the representation of professional occupations e.g. lawyers and social workers shows a steady decline. How have these affected the composition of major political parties in India? And how far the parties are distinguishable from each other in terms of their occupational support bases? Table 2.3 summarizes the data on occupation<sup>20</sup> of our respondents and their party affiliation.

Our data also show that the agricultural occupations predominate: as much as 39 per cent of the total respondents belong to agricultural occupation followed by 31.6, 13.8 and 10.3 per cents in professional, business, and political and social occupational categories respectively. Interestingly, a closer scrutiny of professional category (31.6 per cent) would suggest that lawyers still constitute the largest group. Similarly, large landowners dominate the agricultural categories (out of 38.8 per cent in agriculture, 36.0 per cent are large farmers). Though the recruitment base of leadership

19. Arora, *op. cit.*, see also Myron Weiner, "Changing Leadership in West Bengal," in A.R. Desai (ed.), *Rural Sociology in India* (Bombay: Popular Book Depot, 1961).

20. This is the occupation which a respondent pursues (or in the case of retired occupation pursued through most of the life) in addition to his political position. For exact wording of the question, see Question No. 7 (BD), Appendix I.

TABLE 2.3  
Occupation By Party Affiliation

[illegible]



seems to have broadened with the increasing number of agriculturists actively participating in politics at various levels, it intrinsically reflect the predominance of large farmers. Thus, recruitment process does not go down far below to mobilize medium and small agriculturists.

The predominance of large farmers and lawyers in the leadership ranks illustrates Weber's observation about economic dispensability of political leaders. As he points out :

...the professional politician must also be economically 'dispensable,' that is his income must not depend upon the fact that he constantly and personally places his ability and thinking entirely or at least by far predominantly, in the service of economic acquisition. (He further adds:) ...it is easier for the lawyer to be dispensable; and therefore the lawyer has played an incomparably greater, and often even a dominant, role as a professional politician.<sup>21</sup>

In India agriculture provides a sound economic base from which a person can draw enough sustenance for his political aspirations. This is for two reasons : one, it needs only seasonal involvement; and, two, the extended family system creates a few spare hands which need not enter into any remunerative occupation. It is perhaps why there is a larger representation in the leadership positions of these two professions, namely, the agriculturists and the lawyers.

Inter-party comparison reveals at least three distinct patterns of recruitment of leaders from various occupational categories. First, there is a group of parties which draws heavily from agricultural sector for recruiting leaders, these are : the Congress followed by the Swatantra, the splinter Congress parties, the Congress (O), and the Socialist parties.

21. Excerpt from Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" in Alessandro Pizzorno (ed.). *Political Sociology*. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971), pp. 27-38.

Second, the two Communist Parties depend largely on full time political and social workers for filling their leadership ranks. In other words, full time involvement in politics and public affairs is the prominent feature of Communist leaders.<sup>22</sup> And finally, the Jana Sangh makes a pattern by itself i.e., it has a distinct base of political recruitment. More than half of its leaders come from the professional and managerial occupational groups followed by business category. It thus shows a distinct bias in favour of recruiting people from urban sectors. This indicates that the party's predominant support base lies in urban areas. Burger also finds that the "Jana Sangh is least-village based party".<sup>23</sup>

### **Rural/urban Background and Party Affiliation**

In India, as elsewhere, urbanization has been a major influence on modernizing processes along with education and industrialization. The ascendance of urban middle class in Indian polity is an artifact of the same. The top ranking leaders in India have mostly come from urban centres. This is due perhaps to the fact that people residing in urban settings are better informed and enjoy an easier access to governmental and political centres than those residing in rural India. Since exposure to politics and public affairs and accessibility to power-wielders are quite effective in bringing individuals to politics, the urban bias is bound to be there at least in the initial stages of recruitment. But, however, the questions remain as to why there is so much difference in the representation of the two segments of Indian people in national politics and why does recruitment of leaders reflect so much inter-party variations. Two questions, relating to the respondents' overall exposure to urban life, were asked of the respondents in this regard.<sup>24</sup> The result is presented in table 2.4.

Despite the fact that more than three fourths of the country's people live in rural India, their representation in

22. This is also supported by Dutta, *op. cit.*,

23. Burger, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

24. See question Numbers 11 and 12 (B.D.).

formal power structure is very low. For example, only one third of the total elite positions are held by the people who have mostly lived in rural areas as against 56.1 per cent in urban centres. Further, as far as their present residence is concerned, as many as 75.5 per cent live in urban areas as against only 23.4 per cent who maintain their residence in rural areas.

Thus, an overall dominance of urban-based leaders in Indian politics, is incontrovertible. But where do different parties stand in this regard? It is true that all parties must have greater representation of urban-based leaders; however, one may expect that the dominant party, which by definition is a broad based party, would have a somewhat greater representation of rural based leaders at various levels. This is confirmed by our data. Of all the national parties, barring the Swatantra, the Congress gives better representation to rural people in its leadership hierarchies. Jana Sangh's rural base seems to be the smallest meaning thereby that the support base of this party exist predominantly in urban areas.<sup>25</sup> It is also evident that the regional parties have greater propensity to draw leaders from rural sections of society. In terms of exposure to rural society, the Congress Party again steals the show. The Jana Sangh once again presents an unbalanced picture on this indicator as well (see table 2.4 A).

Despite the fact that some parties are largely urban based the occupational distribution of leaders shows an increasing number of agriculturists now fill leadership ranks broadening the spectrum of political recruitment. However, the channels of political participation and political recruitment are still not quite open to sections other than those who are economically better off.

### Income and Party Affiliation

Information regarding one's income is most difficult to

25. See also Rajni Kothari, *Politics in India* (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1970), p. 207.

**TABLE 2.4**  
**Rural/Urban Exposure by Party Affiliation**

[illegible]

ascertain for two reasons. First, some people try to under-report their incomes, especially those in the high income brackets. Second, the majority of people in unorganized sectors have difficulty in calculating their annual and/or monthly incomes. Hence, it is quite difficult to get reliable information about people's income and therefore well nigh impossible to say anything about income distribution with confidence. Our discussion of where our leaders stand in terms of income and how are the various parties differentiated in this respect must be treated with reservations.

Income generally depends on the type of occupation one follows. As we have already seen, people belonging to professional, business, and agricultural occupations dominate the leadership positions in our sample. If occupation has any bearing on one's income then one should also expect to find that large income groups have larger share in leadership positions. Our data fully support this; the average household income of our respondents works out to be Rs. 1396 per month. Table 2.5 shows that the largest number of leaders come from the highest income category; 32.3 per cent of the total leaders have a monthly household income of 'rupees one thousand and above.' In contradistinction to this, only 9.4 per cent have a monthly income of less than Rs. 300. Moreover, a large number of leaders are located in higher income categories. This means that the economically well off people have greater chances of reaching leadership positions than those belonging to lower economic strata.

An interesting observation relates to the fact that a large number of leaders evince lower incomes in ideological parties, for example, as much as 41.2 per cent of CPM leaders come from the lowest income group. The CPI occupies the next place. Of the remaining parties, the Socialists and the DMK recruit a large number of leaders from the second lowest income category, while all other parties do so from the highest income category. Of course, as one would expect, the Swatantra, the Congress (O) and the Jana Sangh have most of their leaders coming from the richest group. This can be ascertained from the fact that the mean income of leaders in

TABLE 25  
Monthly Income by Party Affiliation

Party	INC	SWA	BJS	CPM	CPI	Socialist Parties	INC (O)	Splinter Congress Parties	DMK	Other Parties	Non-Party	Total
Monthly Income												
Less than Rs. 300	6.8	10.2	8.1	41.2	19.4	27.1	7.5	3.7	8.3	3.7	4.3	9.4
Rs 301 to Rs 500	17.9	14.3	15.1	29.4	44.4	27.1	23.7	22.2	37.5	22.2	21.7	21.1
Rs 501 to Rs 700	14.8	10.2	8.1	—	13.9	8.3	8.6	5.6	4.2	—	8.7	10.8
Rs 701 to Rs 1000	22.2	20.4	22.1	11.8	5.6	20.8	7.5	25.9	20.8	29.6	17.4	19.7
Rs 1001 and more	32.1	38.8	44.2	5.9	5.6	8.3	45.2	31.5	29.2	29.6	43.5	32.3
N.A.	6.3	6.1	2.3	11.8	11.1	8.3	7.5	11.1	—	14.8	4.3	6.8
Total	N	352	49	86	17	36	48	93	54	24	23	809
%		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mean Monthly Income in Rupees.		1269	2194	1678	615	619	664	1949	1454	958	1580	1396

Swatantra is Rs. 2194 per month followed by the Congress (O) and the Jana Sangh. The CPM occupies the lowest position with Rs. 615 per month mean income. Thus, while the Congress appears to be the most broad-based party as it recruits its leaders from almost all socio-economic interest groups, the left parties seem to attract people from lower and lower-middle classes and the splinter Congress parties and the DMK draw most of their leaders from lower-middle and middle classes. The Jana Sangh and the Congress (O) seem to be the parties of the middle classes in general and urban middle classes in particular.

### **Size of Land Holding and Party Affiliation**

Related to income is the size of land holding one owns. In rural India perhaps the land holding size is a better indicator of one's economic status. Although the representation of rural people in our sample is relatively lower than what is due to them, yet the agriculturist constitutes a large proportion of leaders. As such, we need to look at the land ownership pattern of the leaders in our sample.

The pattern suggested by the occupational background of our leaders is confirmed by the distribution of land ownership (Table 2.6). First, the Communist Parties whose leadership is drawn mostly from political and social workers followed by the Socialists, have majority of their leaders coming from the small peasantry (average land holding size being 5.7 acres for the CPM, 18.7 acres for the CPI and 21 acres for the Socialists). Second, the Swatantra—a party of ex-Talukedars and landlords—has the largest share of its leaders coming from the highest land owning category. Quite interestingly, the average size of land holding for its leaders is 121 acres. Third, the splinter Congress parties, which include the BKD of U.P. and the Jana Congress of Orissa, rank second as far as the size of land holding is concerned (average land holding size being 58.5 acres). This suggests that their support base lies in the peasant proprietary castes in rural India. And, finally, the Congress, given its eclectic character, draws its leaders almost in equal proportion from all categories making it thereby the most broad-based party of the existing lot.

TABLE 2.6  
Size of Land Holding by Party Affiliation

Land Holding	Party										Total
	INC	SWA	BJS	CPM	CPI	Socialist Parties	INC (O)	Splinter Congress Parties	DMK	Other Parties	
5 acres or less	25.3	24.5	41.9	70.6	50.0	29.2	25.8	22.2	33.3	48.1	30.4 30.3
6 acres to 10 acres	8.5	6.1	14.0	5.9	13.9	16.7	12.9	13.0	37.5	11.1	13.0 11.5
11 acres to 15 acres	7.1	4.1	3.5	5.9	2.8	10.4	6.5	11.1	4.2	—	— 6.2
16 acres to 20 acres	9.1	2.0	7.0	11.8	5.6	12.5	9.7	5.6	12.5	18.5	4.3 8.7
21 acres to 25 acres	7.1	—	5.8	5.9	5.6	8.3	2.2	5.6	—	7.4	— 5.4
26 acres to 30 acres	5.1	16.3	2.3	—	5.6	2.1	10.8	1.9	8.3	—	17.4 5.9
31 acres to 35 acres	2.3	—	2.3	—	—	2.1	2.2	1.9	4.2	3.7	8.7 2.2
36 acres and more	33.0	42.9	22.1	—	16.7	16.7	24.7	35.2	—	7.4	26.1 27.2
N. A.	2.6	4.1	1.2	—	—	—	5.4	3.6	—	3.7	— 2.6
Total	N 352	49	86	17	36	48	93	54	24	27	23 809
%	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0 100.0
Mean Size of Land-holding in acres	47.4	121.0	40.3	5.7	18.7	21.0	40.4	58.5	10.6	29.9	33.3 45.1



## Caste and Party Affiliation

Caste in India is an age old system which can undoubtedly be regarded as one of the most pervasive social institutions of Indian society. Being an offshoot of the *Varna* system, it carries some of the broader similarities in the pursuit of family occupations. Social as well as ritual interaction takes place among the members of the same caste and/or sub-castes. Such ties may be regarded as traditional but they are there and, more often than not, are reflected in group processes. Political parties use caste as 'interest group'. Political manipulators use it as 'pressure group'. And the social scientists use it as one of the most powerful determinants of group behaviour. However, the use of caste in politics and in other group processes is publicly criticized by almost every body but the fact remains, as Srinivas notes, that, "caste is so tacitly and so completely accepted by all, including those most vocal in condemning it, that it is everywhere the unit of social action."<sup>26</sup> As far as politics in India is concerned, caste has played quite an important role in it. For example, there are evidences in the literature that vote preferences are made on caste lines; parties select candidates on the basis of caste basis dominance in the constituency; and some times even the factions in parties are based on caste considerations.<sup>27</sup> It is in this context that we would like to see the caste composition of our political parties. Table 2.7 presents the relevant data.

First, Table 2.7 clearly suggests that, like urban segments, the upper castes too enjoy an overall dominance in leadership positions. Interestingly, the impact of 'Brahminic society'

26. M.N. Srinivas, 'Caste In Modern India', *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. XVI, 1956-57, p. 548.

27. Norman D. Palmer, *Elections and Political Development: The South Asian Experience*, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Private Limited, 1976), pp. 269-301; see also Ramashray Roy, "Selection of Congress Candidates, I-V *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 1, No. 20, 1966 and Vol. II, Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 1967; see also Paul R. Brass, *Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965); and see also H.A. Gould, "Towards a 'Jati' Model for Indian Politics", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. IV, February, 1969.



seems to be quite relevant even in modern India since 17.2 per cent of leaders belong to the Brahmin caste. Second, the Scheduled tribes and castes who enjoy reservation in legislative positions have a very insignificant share in leadership positions and power structure as compared to their proportion in the total population of the country. As against their share in general population (6.9 and 14.6 per cent respectively) only 2.0 and 5.3 per cent of Scheduled tribes, and castes respectively fall in our leadership sample. And, finally, the Muslims, too, are under-represented in the sample i.e. their share in leadership positions is only 3.5 per cent as against 11.2 per cent in the total population. Thus, the minorities along with those ranked low in the caste-hierarchy are disadvantageously placed in filling power positions in India.

What about the caste composition of leaders in various political parties? As is evident from Table 2.7, almost all the national parties are predominantly dominated by upper castes. For example, upper castes and the Brahmins put together account for 47.5 per cent of the leadership positions in the Congress party; 46.9 per cent in the Swatantra; and 81.4 per cent in the Jana Sangh. The Socialists are an exception. This may be attributed to their conscious attempt to win-over the middle castes. Also, the Socialists, like regional parties, have localized bases of support. The regional parties, viz., splinter Congress parties and the DMK seem to draw greater support from the middle caste communities. As is expected, of all the political parties the DMK, with its antecedents in anti-Brahmin movement, gives the largest representation to the low castes in its leadership hierarchy.

The caste composition of leaders brings out some very interesting facts about the nature of support structure of various parties. First, the Jana Sangh, despite its claim of being an open party, does not seem to have made such headway in attracting people from groups other than the high caste Hindus. That is, it has failed in recruiting leaders from amongst the Muslims. Its urban bias is reflected once again in mobilizing support from various social units. Second, the DMK's origin as an anti-Brahmin party is very clearly reflected in our data

because not a single leader comes from this caste. Third, the Socialists and the splinter Congress parties have their bases in middle castes—the upwardly mobile peasant-proprietary castes. And, finally, the hegemony of the dominant party is securely rooted in its recruitment of leaders from all caste groups. As a matter of fact, the caste distribution of its leaders is similar to the caste distribution of all leaders in our sample.

In short, the upper segments of society enjoy an overall dominance in leadership positions and consequently in Indian politics. Similarly, it is clearly reflected in our data that the hold of the traditional sector on modern political institutions still persists. For example, one could have expected a considerable reduction in the salience of caste in politics by now under the pressure of modernizing influences operating through legislation as well as industrialization and urbanization. However, the elites, particularly the political leaders, instead of strengthening secular tendencies, have sought to mobilize support through castes and other primordial loyalties. It should also be pointed out that the upper castes' domination in the leadership is based on their greater command over and access to resources, real and potential. That is why they have been able to derive greater advantage of higher education and absorption in the modern organised sector of economy.<sup>28</sup>

It is generally true that the leadership positions in almost all the parties are predominantly occupied by older, urban, upper caste, highly educated and occupationally well-placed persons. However, the recruitment pattern differs from party to party. For example, the CPI and the Jana Sangh emerge as parties manned mostly by urban people, yet their bases of support are different. The former attracts people from lower classes while the latter has become the party of middle and upper middle classes. Similarly, the Congress, the Swatantra, and the splinter Congress parties seem to have stronger bases in rural India (if one chooses the occupation of leaders as the

28 For a discussion on how higher caste status and educational attainment converge, see Richard D. Lambert, *Workers, Factories and Social Change in India*, Princeton: (Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 50.

criterion of ruralness). However, closer scrutiny would suggest that the support bases, of these parties lie in different socio-economic interest groups. That is, while the Congress recruits its leaders from a very wide cross-section, the Swatantra attracts people mostly from large landowning class, and the splinter Congress parties the middle castes and middle peasantry.

While ideology plays a minor role in mobilizing support at the grass-root—a left-right divide in support mobilization is discernible in the case of a few parties. For example, the Communists and the Socialist parties are mostly manned by people belonging to lower income groups and lower and middle castes (Table 2.5 and 2.7). However, the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra draw their activists from upper castes and higher income groups.

Thus, we find that the leadership in India comes largely from the upper segments of the society. Irrespective of social stratification categories one chooses to employ, one would invariably find that the upper strata of the social pyramid have disproportionate share in the distribution of power positions in the society and politics. How far are these initial advantages in attaining leadership positions are really maintained throughout one's political career? Is it one's social background or experience that helps in further advancement in one's political career? These, as well as other questions like political socialization, etc. we intend to discuss in the next chapter.

# 3

## **Political Career : Socialization, Mobility and Achievement**

So far we have discussed the socio-economic and demographic profile of party activists and political leaders. Our data show that the social composition of Indian leaders does not truly reflect the composition of the vast citizenry of the country from which they are drawn. In fact, the upper segments of the society are over-represented in filling up the leadership positions in the country. There are leaders from lower strata of society, to be sure. However, these strata are acutely under-represented. Thus, the preponderance of people belonging to upper sections of society in leadership positions, on the one hand, and under-representation of lower sections of society, on the other, clearly suggest that the higher the socio-economic status one enjoys, better are his chances of entering into leadership echelon and power positions of the society.

The socio-economic and demographic profile of Indian leaders tells us two things about the recruitment process. First, the over-represented higher socio-economic strata constitute what Prewitt calls "the pool of eligibles" from

which the leaders are recruited.<sup>1</sup> Second, the underrepresented lower strata indicate what Schlesinger and Seligman characterises as a "political opportunity structure" available to people, particularly to the politically aspirant ones.<sup>2</sup> For example, formation of certain political parties with avowed egalitarian aims has helped the expansion of opportunity-structure by way of attracting political activists from lower-segments of society. At more formal level, positive discrimination by way of reservation of seats for the Scheduled castes and tribes, too, has helped in mobilizing the hitherto-unmobilized and indigent sections of the society. In other words, "the organisational scaffolding of leadership positions and cadre roles has vastly enlarged the possibility for career in public life."<sup>3</sup> However, "political opportunity expand or contract with changes in the supply of eligibles and changes in the demand for people to fill political roles."<sup>4</sup> But in real life-situation the picture is not so neat. Despite the fact that there is the pool of eligibles and a wide variety of openings available for new entrants in politics and public affairs, neither everybody from this pool has inclination to actively participate in politics nor the political opportunity structure is elastic enough to accomodate all the politically ambitious individuals. Then

1. Kenneth Prewitt, *The Recruitment of Political Leaders: A Study of Citizen-Politicians* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970). The term 'pool of eligibles' as used here, is a socio-economic category covering the upper strata of society. We call this group as eligibles because of its advantageous position on various indicators of socio-economic ranking and its potentiality to send its members to the leadership positions. The failure on these indicators, however, impede the chances of one's acquiring a place in the leadership positions.
2. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "political Careers and Party Leadership;" and Lester Seligman, "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Political Leaders," in Lewis J. Edinger (ed.), *Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies* (New York: John Wiley, 1967).
3. Dwaine Marvick, "Recruitment Pattern of Campaign Activists in India: Legislative Candidates, Public Notables, and the Organizational Personnel of Rival Parties," in H. Eulau and M.M. Czumowski (ed.), *Elite Recruitment in Democratic Politics: Comparative Studies Across Nations* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 159.
4. "Continuities in Recruitment Theory and Research: Towards a New-Model," *Ibid.*, p. 31.

the questions arise : who enters politics, at what levels and how ? Answers to these lie in a careful probing of socialization and recruitment processes through which each individual (politically aspirant) is inducted and initiated into politics and makes further advancement in his political career.

The fact that not everybody from the pool of eligibles joins politics and the instances of a number of cases where individuals from outside the pool, too, have entered politics underlines the influence of socializing factors. These factors create and reinforce the activist ethos in an individual or, conversely, impede the formation of it. In modern politics, the acquired characteristics are gradually compensating the erosion of ascriptive qualifications which characterized the earlier leadership. But ironically, the acquired characteristics are closely related to ascriptive ones or, are mostly influenced by them. That is, most of the acquired attributes e.g. education, occupation, exposure and, over and above these, the contacts and connections are, by and large, easily cultivated by those who are already endowed with ascriptive assets. However, the impact of modernization, particularly through expansion of educational facilities in the country, and a wide variety of modern political institutions can hardly be underemphasized. Because of the limitation of data, relating particularly to the leaders' initial socialization, it is not possible to talk about leaders' early socialization. However, information on leaders' father's education, and father's as well as family members' involvement in politics does to some extent help us in understanding the leaders' early socialization. In addition, combining with this the data on factors influencing one's entry into politics, can throw at least some light on the leaders' socialization prior to their entry into active politics.

Political career is full of a wide variety of mediating experiences that accordingly inform or reform one's behaviour and outlook. Early experiences and socialization that the leader goes through are undoubtedly important in colouring his later political judgements or sharpening his political sensitivities. However, day-to-day experiences he acquires in his actual active political life are also of no less significance.



Infact, "the process of 'political socialization' is a continuing one and the rising politician or businessman or unionist may well alter his outlook fundamentally during his career."<sup>5</sup> A leader can hardly ignore the experiences acquired in his political career in general and subsequent advancement in it in particular--both in organizational and governmental positions. As Marvick puts it:

An individual's life path through the communal and corporate infrastructure of his society never ceases, in one sense, to be an apprenticeship, one that equips him with crucial skills and typical attitudes as well as with material resources and organization sponsors—all of which are necessary as credentials at subsequent major career thresholds. (He further continues) As a learning process, it is preceded by *citizen socialization*, on which it builds, and even more immediately, by *activist socialization*, which is cadre-supervised but seldom explicitly taught and which takes place largely during mobilization phases of a nation's political life. In turn, it is augmented by the specialised norms, practices, and skills of *leadership socialization*, learned in a never-ending sequence of apprenticeship roles, and preoccupied with the institutional practices and organizational arrangements found in the career orbits in which leaders aspire to make their way.<sup>6</sup>

As such, several factors assume importance. First, it is of interest to know the leaders' socialization prior to their entry into active politics. Second, it is also important to take a look at the leaders' socialization while in politics. Questions such as when did they enter into politics; what party or parties they worked for; and what positions have they occupied in parties and government need to be answered. Third, the life-cycle of leaders in politics, that is, the path(s) they have adopted in order to achieve what they have achieved needs to be explored. And, finally, the relative significance of socio-economic

5. Geraint Parry, *Political Elites: Studies in Political Science* (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1969), p. 97.

6. Marvick, "Continuity in Recruitment...". *op. cit.*, p. 37.

background and the experiences gained during apprenticeship in active politics in facilitating the leaders' advancement in political career needs to be assessed.

To begin with, we shall first deal with some of the factors that facilitate political socialization of leaders. Limitations of data do not permit a clear analysis of this aspect of the question. However, by focussing on educational attainments of leader's father, involvement in politics by the leader's family members and the reasons leading to the leader's entry into politics, we hope to gain knowledge about the environmental conditions and motivational aspect of leadership socialization.

### Fathers' Education

Institution of family plays quite an important role in the shaping of one's personality. Educational level of the family can easily be regarded as one of the most powerful determinants of family milieu. If the educational level is high the level of general awareness among the family members would also be high.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, discussion about politics and exposure to the outer world are more likely to occur in families with higher level of education as against those with low level of education. Since information is available with respect only to the fathers' level of education, we present this information in Table 3.1.

TABLE 3.1  
Distribution of Fathers' Education  
(N=810)

<i>Educational Level of Fathers</i>	<i>Leaders (in percent)</i>
Illiterate	19.5
Educated upto Primary School	38.9
Middle & High School not completed	11.2
High School	13.2
College but no Degree	4.7
Degree and above	8.5
N.A.	4.0

7. Evidences of such relationships exist beyond doubt in the literature. See for example, Lester Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Chapters II and III; also see D.L. Sheth, "Partisanship and Political Development," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VI, Nos. 3-5, Annual Number, January, 1971.

Unlike leaders' own educational attainments, their fathers' educational level is not very high. While 52.3 per cent of the leaders have college degree or above (see Table 2.2), only 13.2 per cent of the fathers have reached that level. A major factor in this divergence may be attributed to generational gap. This is one way of looking at the present data. However, if looked at from a different perspective, the picture changes radically. If we compare the leaders' fathers' educational level with that of the general population contemporary to their time, the leaders' fathers would certainly seem to have higher educational attainments. Such a conjecture is quite within the limits of reason, particularly when we consider the fact that only 19.5 per cent of the leaders' fathers are illiterate as against 60.6 per cent illiterate among the general male population even today.<sup>8</sup> Our data bear sufficient evidence to the fact that the families with high educational attainments induce their younger members to join leadership ranks.

### **Family Members' Involvement in Politics**

More than any other single factor, the presence of those in the family who take part in politics has a direct bearing on political socialisation of other members, particularly of the younger generation. The general level of political participation, would, in all probability, be higher in such families than in those where no one is active in politics. It is due mainly to the fact that the very presence of politically involved persons in the family increases the frequency of political discussion, encourages contact with the outside world, especially with other political workers and leaders, and, consequently increases the amount of political stimuli. Or, in the words of Marvick,

parents who exemplify active citizenship by their own adult behaviour are creating the kind of home environment rich in meaningful references to political events and

8. According to 1971 census 60.55 per cent of the male population are illiterate. The same figure for 1961 and 1951 censuses are 65.56 and 75.05 per cent respectively.

symbols which politicizes many of the children while still young and which helps to explain why in their own adult years they move into the active political stratum.<sup>9</sup>

All these put together increase general level of political consciousness and have the propensity to inculcate political activist character among other family members. Once a family member occupies an important position in party and government, the probability of other members moving into active political stratum increases.

In this context, we are interested in finding out whether or not the leaders' fathers or other family members took part in politics.<sup>10</sup> Relevant information is presented in Table 3.2.

TABLE 3.2  
Distribution of Leaders by their Father's and  
Family Member's Involvement in Politics  
(N=810)

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Father took interest in politics	42.7 per cent
Family member(s) took interest in politics	47.7 per cent
Either father or family member(s) took interest in politics	62.8 per cent

---

Table 3.2 reveals that as high as 42.7 per cent of our respondents report that their fathers were interested in politics. Similar is the case with other family members, i.e. 47.7 per cent are reported to have been interested in politics. In Indian context where the norm of extended family is still very salient, a composite view by combining information on the fathers' and other members' interest in politics will yield better

9. Marvick, "Recruitment Pattern...", *op. cit.* p. 149.

10. Two questions were administered to tap this information: (a) Was your father interested in politics? and (b) Were there any other members of your family who were interested in politics? For exact wording of the questions, see questions 7, 7a, 7b, and 7c in Appendix I.

result. When combined, as high as 62.8 per cent of our leaders grew up in families where some of their members were politically active or interested in politics.<sup>11</sup>

The preponderance of leaders coming from the already politically involved families suggests two things. First, people growing up in politically involved and exposed families have greater possibility of entering into politics. Second, like any other profession, even the political leadership also seems to follow a family occupation (see table 2, Appendix III).

While leaders are, by and large, drawn from the 'pool of eligibles', the recruitment of leaders from outside the pool is not by any means rare. It is of interest to isolate and identify these leaders from outside this pool and find out the socio-economic background they come from.<sup>12</sup>

As is revealed in Table 3.3 there are only 34 leaders (4.2 per cent) who, according to our measure, fall outside of the pool. In contradistinction to this we find as many as 400 leaders (49.4 per cent) who enjoy high status on all the four indicators, 274 (33.8 per cent) fall in the second highest

11. Pantham and Marvick also report similar findings. See Thomas Pantham, *Political Parties and Democratic Consensus* (Delhi: The Macmillan Company of India Limited, 1976), p. 92; and Marvick, "Recruitment Pattern...", *op. cit.*, p. 149.

12. For this purpose, we take education, family income, size of land holding of the family, and caste status of the respondent as indicators of his social status i.e. whether the respondent belongs to the 'pool of eligibles' or not. Then we dichotomise each of the indicators into low and high—low being the category of people who fall outside of the pool of eligibles. We, then find 92 cases falling outside the pool on education, 131 on family income, 226 on land size, and 128 on caste status. And, finally, we scan all our respondents on each of these indicators simultaneously. Low category includes all those cases who are not educated beyond 8th standard with less than rupees 300/- per month family income and less than 6 acres of land and belong to caste groups of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Low Castes. In addition to this all those cases about whom information on anyone of these indicators were not available are also treated as falling in the low category.

category and only 27 (3.3 per cent) who are high on only one indicator.

TABLE 3.3  
Distribution of Leaders in Different Categories of  
'Pool of Eligibles'  
(N=810)

<i>Eligibility</i>	<i>Number of cases</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Qualify on all the four indicators	400	49.4
Qualify on three indicators	274	33.8
Qualify on two indicators	75	9.3
Qualify on only one indicator	27	3.3
Do not qualify on any of the indicators	34	4.2

In order to find an explanation of how these persons from outside the pool of eligibles became active in politics we have to take into consideration the influence of father's education and presence of politically involved members in the family. We find that of the 34 leaders, fathers of 12 leaders had education upto middle school or above and 17 leaders grew in politically active families. Thus, apart from socio-economic background, socialization, particularly the political socialization in the family, explains the entry of people in the politics who are otherwise placed in a disadvantageous position in terms of socio-economic background.

#### **Motivations for Entry into Politics**

One way to look at the entry of individuals into politics is to ascertain motivating factors that led them to politics.

Initial arousal of interest in politics and factors influencing one's entry into politics is, in a sense, the foundation-stone on which leader's activist career is built. Why one joins politics? Or, what is it that attracts one to politics? Answers to these questions would shed some light on the commitments that would sustain leaders and their career in politics. Generally speaking, people enter into politics with a wide variety of purposes ranging from personal to social good. For example, some may be motivated to join politics only to improve their own socio-economic position, such as to gain power, prestige or material rewards etc.; others may join politics for impersonal gains, such as to put their ideology into effect or to serve the people, etc. Although, making a distinction between the two is not always possible, there are differences in emphasis put on the one or the other. What are the motivation factors in the case of leaders in our sample?<sup>13</sup> Table 3.4 provides a clue to this.

Keeping in mind the age structure of our present sample, the mention of 'Freedom Movement' as the most important motivating factor for entering into politics is quite natural and also meaningful. We would use the word "meaningful" in the sense that participation in the freedom movement reflected the dominant political ethos of the time. Similarly, responses as these, "I wanted to serve the people". "I was moved by the socio-economic condition of the people", "I wanted to improve the lot of the depressed and the downtrodden", and "I wanted to serve my community" are the stock moral statements a public figure usually chooses to make. This is very well supported by our data. Note, for example, that 25.7 per cent of leaders (the second largest category) mention as their motivating factor for entry into politics. Again, in the third category of responses were such purposes as "it was my duty as a citizen to take part in politics"; "my patriotic feeling drew me to politics"; or "I wanted to improve my own social position" which seem to have influenced one's entry into politics. What is surprising is that very few leaders in our sample mention ideologies, policies and programmes as motivation force for entering into politics.

13. See question 4, Appendix I.

TABLE 3.4  
Motivations for Entry into Politics by Party Affiliation

Motivations for Entry into Politics													
Party	INC	SIVA	BJS	CPM	CPI	Socialist Parties	INC (O)	Splinter Congress Parties	DMK	Other Parties	Non-Party	Total	
Motivations													
Primordial pressure and ties	10.5	16.3	3.5	—	—	6.2	10.8	5.5	—	3.7	26.1	71 8.8	
Organizational links and involvement in agitations and movements other than Freedom Movement	9.7	2.0	5.8	5.9	2.7	4.2	5.4	12.7	54.2	3.7	4.3	71 8.8	
Freedom Movement	33.6	26.6	15.1	47.0	63.9	47.9	50.4	29.1	16.6	14.9	21.8	274 33.8	
Personal inclination and dispositions	15.6	18.3	31.4	5.9	13.9	14.6	15.1	20.0	8.4	7.4	8.7	135 16.7	
Concern for socio-economic conditions of the people, society group(s)	30.7	30.2	30.2	17.7	13.9	18.8	17.2	30.9	16.6	66.8	21.8	208 25.7	
Ideological consideration and concern for specific policies and programmes	3.7	6.1	12.8	23.5	5.6	8.3	1.1	1.8	4.2	3.7	13.0	44 5.4	
Not ascertained	1.4	1.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4.3	7 0.8	
Total	N %	352 100.0	49 100.0	86 100.0	17 100.0	36 100.0	48 100.0	93 100.0	55 100.0	24 100.0	27 100.0	23 100.0	810 100.0



A comparison across-parties brings out five interesting points. First, the older parties differ from others in that a majority of leaders in these parties claim that their entry into politics was induced by the freedom movement. Second, the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh are alike since a large number of their leaders (Swatantra, 30.7 per cent and Jana Sangh, 30.2 per cent) mention the "concern for socio-economic conditions of the people and the group (s)" as the principal motivating factor. Interestingly, the splinter Congress parties and other minor parties also fall in this category. Third, the DMK emerges as a single group whose leaders, by and large, have been drawn into politics through their participation in agitational activities such as anti-Hindi movement, Self-Respect Movement, etc. Fourth, as expected, the non-Party people came into politics mostly through primordial pressures and ties. And, finally, except the CPM, no party seems to have attracted people through its ideology, policies and programmes.

In addition, the period of entry (i.e. the political climate in which a person entered politics) seems to have an important bearing on motivations influencing one's entry into politics and thereby endowing particular character to the parties they joined. For example, of the 69 leaders who joined politics after 1963, more than 72 per cent did it due to their personal inclination and concern for socio-economic conditions of the people. This is in sharp contrast to those who joined politics before independence. For example, of 413 leaders only 23.2 per cent express personal inclination and concern for socio-economic conditions as motivating factors for joining politics, as against more than 56 per cent who joined through freedom movement (see Appendix III, Table 3). The same is the case with primordial pressures and ties as motivating factors which also show an increase from 6.8 per cent in the case of those joining before 1947, to 9.7 per cent in 1948 to 1952, 11.0 per cent in 1953 to 1962 and 13.0 per cent in the category who joined after 1963.

### **Pattern of Political Career**

The above discussion leads us to explore the initial star tof

political career of leaders. It is generally argued that periods of initial mobilization into politics have important bearing on leaders' political career and, consequently, on the parties they belong to. Moreover, in politics the political generation is usually referred to in terms of periods of recruitment no less than age as the central criterion. The politicians themselves, while using terms like "old workers" and "newcomers", have periods of entry into politics as their referent points. Their criticism of their counterparts within the party as well as in other parties, too, are influenced by such criteria. And thus, the generational difference in itself assumes a role of potential axis of political cleavage and conflict on the one-hand, and influences the style of political action and is the source of differences in political values of the leaders on the other. For example, 'old workers' consider participation in the nationalist movement as symbolic of political purity and sacrifice. They often look down upon the 'newcomers' and criticise them for the lack of the spirit of sacrifice, for they have to risk nothing for entering into politics. On the other hand, the younger generation or those who are labelled as 'newcomers', by and large, claim themselves to be more suited to the changed socio-political climate and consider themselves as radicals and pro-changers as against the older generation which, they feel, lacks dynamism and is least suited for the radical changes the society must undergo.

Keeping these consideration in mind, the periods of political recruitment need to be divided into two major categories : first, those who joined politics before independence and, second, who joined after. Since most of those who joined politics after independence were hurtled into politics through elections they are further divided into three categories ; those who entered politics during 1948 to 1952, 1953 to 1962, and post-1963, periods. Relevant data in this regard are presented in table 3.5.

It is interesting to note that both the Communist parties have the largest proportion of leaders belonging to older generation, followed by the Congress (O), Congress and the Socialist parties. That is, as high as 82.4 per cent of the CPM

TABLE 3.5  
**Present Party Affiliation and Year  
 When R First Joined A Party**  
 (in per cent)\*

<i>Year of Joining</i>		<i>1947 or before</i>	<i>1948-52</i>	<i>1953-62</i>	<i>1963 and after</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Party</i>						
INC		56.8	17.6	18.2	6.8	352
SWA		36.7	20.4	26.5	16.3	49
BJS		15.1	39.5	25.6	17.4	86
CPM		82.4	—	17.6	—	17
CPI		77.8	11.1	11.1	—	36
Socialist Parties		58.3	25.0	14.6	2.1	48
INC (O)		59.1	16.1	17.2	7.5	93
Splinter Congress Parties		47.3	10.9	20.0	21.8	55
DMK		50.0	20.9	25.0	4.2	24
Other Parties		37.0	22.2	22.2	3.7	27
Non-party**		39.1	4.3	8.7	—	23
Total						
	N	413	155	154	69	810
	%	51.0	19.1	19.0	8.5	100.0

\* Percentages do not add up to 100.0 because of "not ascertained" cases.

\*\* There are 47.8 per cent cases of the non-party category who never belonged to a party.

leaders in our sample had joined a political party before independence. At the other extreme, the Jana Sangh has only 15.1 per cent of its leaders who entered active politics during that period. Swatantra is next in this category, followed by other insignificant minor parties and non-party leaders.

Two inferences may be drawn from this data : one, chronological age of parties seem to have positive relationship with the periods of entry of their leaders into politics. And, two, since the Congress was the only important party in pre-independent India, parties formed by the leaders coming out of it too have large proportion of leaders belonging to older generations.

The latter observation needs to be further examined. To do so we relate leaders' present party affiliation with that of the first party they joined (Table 3.6). Not surprisingly, the undivided Congress provides the base for almost all the parties. The reasons for it are not far to seek. Since the nationalist movement was spearheaded by the Congress, most of the leaders were, at one time or the other, members of this organization. Only in post-independent India, the clash of programmes, principles and personalities came to the surface. Those who differed with the well-entrenched leadership of the then Congress party left the organization and formed different parties with other like-minded people. This possibly explains the presence of a large number of leaders with Congress antecedents in non-Congress parties—as many as 188 out of the 304 leaders, with more than one party background, were, at one time or the other, members of the undivided Congress party.

Second observation which flows from the table is that the parties coming into existence during the mass-politics of post-independent India (one may call it election politics) have lesser number of leaders from the undivided Congress. The parties falling in this category are the Jana Sangh and the DMK. That is, only 12 out of 86 Jana Sangh leaders have come from the undivided Congress. Similarly, 6 out of 24 DMK leaders are from the undivided Congress. In the case

	First Party	INC	INC (O)	Undivided Congress	SWA	BJS	CPI	Undivided Communist Party	Socialist Parties	Dravida Kazhagam	Other Parties	No Changes in Party Affiliation	Never in Party	Total
	Present Party													
INC		3	36*	1	3	3	4	18	1	12	271	352		
			(0.9)	(10.2)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(5.0)	(0.3)	(3.4)	(77.0)			
SWA			22		1					9	17	49		
			(44.9)		(2.0)					(18.4)	(34.7)			
BJS		2	12					1		7	64	86		
		(2.3)	(14.0)					(1.2)		(8.2)	(74.4)			
CPM			10								7	17		
			(58.8)								(41.2)			
CPI			16								20	36		
			(44.4)								(55.4)			

	First Party	INC	INC (O)	Undivided Congress	SWA	BJS	CPI	Undivided Communist Party	Socialist Parties	Dravida Kazhagam	Other Parties	No Changes in Party Affiliation	Never in Party	Total
	Present Party													
INC		3	36*	1	3	3	4	18	1	12	271	352		
			(0.9)	(10.2)	(0.3)	(0.9)	(1.1)	(5.0)	(0.3)	(3.4)	(77.0)			
SWA			22		1					9	17	49		
			(44.9)		(2.0)					(18.4)	(34.7)			
BJS		2	12					1		7	64	86		
		(2.3)	(14.0)					(1.2)		(8.2)	(74.4)			
CPM			10								7	17		
			(58.8)								(41.2)			
CPI			16								20	36		
			(44.4)								(55.4)			

Socialist Parties	25 (52.1)	15 (31.2)	1 (2.1)	7 (14.6)	48						
INC (O)	6* (6.5)	4 (4.4)	2 (2.2)	81 (87.1)	93						
Splinter Congress Parties	8 (14.5)	2 (3.6)	2 (3.6)	7 (12.7)	55						
DMK	6 (25.0)	1 (3.7)	6 (25.0)	12 (50.0)	24						
Other Parties	13 (48.1)	1 (3.7)	4 (14.8)	9 (33.4)	27						
Non-Party	10 (43.5)	1 (4.3)	1 (4.3)	11 (47.8)	23						
Total	10 (1.2)	3 (0.4)	3 (0.4)	5 (0.6)	4 (0.5)	4 (0.5)	7 (0.8)	37 (4.6)	495 (61.1)	11 (1.4)	810

\*These figures represent those cases who started their political career with undivided Congress, left in between but came back once again to rejoin their respective parties.

of other parties, roughly half or, in some cases, even more than half of their leaders originate from the undivided Congress. Of course, the two Congress parties of the 1971 are the exceptions.

Third, like the undivided Congress, the socialist parties and the other minor and regional parties have also been instrumental in recruiting new leaders who subsequently drifted to other parties. It is perhaps for this reason that these two groups have supplied leaders to almost all the political parties.

And, finally, the Congress and the splinter Congress parties attracted leaders to their fold from a large number of parties. Power aspirations perhaps explain the phenomenon in both the cases. While the former, being in power, was able to attract a large number of defectors on numerous occasions the latter also had an opportunity to do so during the 1967 elections when a large number of states voted the Congress out of power for the first time.

The breaking away from the undivided Congress has a well-established tradition. However, the changes in party affiliation and party-loyalties of most of the party leaders bespeak the rampant phenomenon of defection in Indian politics. Table 3.7 shows that out of 810 leaders as many as 304 have changed parties. Of this 168 changed their party only once, 87 twice, 34 three times, 13 four times and 2 for five times.

A comparison across parties suggests that the Socialists out-beat everybody as far as frequent change in party affiliations is concerned. That is, as many as 14 of them (29.2 per cent) changed their party affiliations three times or more. Or, looked at differently, of the 49 leaders who changed their parties three times or more roughly 29 per cent belong to Socialist parties as against 34.7 per cent of the Congress party's strength in the sample. In fact, in relative sense the proportion of frequent changers in the Congress is lower than those in DMK (8.3 per cent), splinter Congress parties (7.2

TABLE 3.7  
Number of Times R Changed Party Affiliation

Present Party Affiliation	Number of Changes					No Change in Party	Never in Party	N
	One	Two	Three	Four	Five			
INC	35 (9.9)	29 (8.2)	9 (2.6)	6 (1.7)	2 (0.6)	271 (77.0)		352
SWA	18 (36.8)	13 (26.5)	1 (2.0)			17 (34.7)		49
BJS	15 (17.4)	5 (5.8)	1 (1.2)	1 (1.2)		64 (74.4)		86
CPM	9 (52.9)	1 (5.9)				7 (41.2)		17
CPI	12 (33.3)	4 (11.1)				20 (55.6)		36



Socialist Parties	14	13	12	2	7	48
	(29.2)	(27.1)	(25.0)	(4.2)	(14.6)	
INC (O)	2	5	5		81	93
	(2.2)	(5.4)	(5.4)		(87.0)	
Splinter Congress Parties	38	6	2	2	7	55
	(69.1)	(10.9)	(3.6)	(3.6)	(12.7)	
DMK	6	4	2		12	24
	(25.0)	(16.7)	(8.3)		(50.0)	
Other Parties	12	5	1		9	27
	(44.4)	(18.5)	(3.7)		(33.3)	
Non-Party	7	2	1	2	11	23
	(30.4)	(8.7)	(4.3)	(8.7)	(47.8)	
Total	168	87	34	13	495	810
	(20.7)	( 0.7)	(4.2)	(1.6)	(61.1)	(1.4)

per cent), Congress-O (5.4 per cent) and among the non-party people it is 13 per cent.

It should also be pointed out that among the leaders changing their party loyalties twice, the Socialists again come on top (27.1 per cent), followed by Swatantra (26.5 per cent), other parties (18.5 per cent), and DMK (16.9 per cent). As far as absolute numbers are concerned, the Congress accounts for the largest number but it is so because of its large share (43.5 per cent) in the total sample.

What is thus reflected is that the occurrence of defection in Indian politics is quite substantial. That is, even if we exclude 168 cases assuming them to include those who might have come from the undivided Congress, the rest constitutes 16.7 per cent of the total national sample which, by any measure, cannot be regarded as insignificant in terms of defection in national politics.

### **Experience in Government and Parties**

The experiences the leaders have had in different bodies of government and party organization during the course of their active political life represent an important dimension of political leadership. We propose to discuss the experiential dimension of the leadership in terms of organizational and elective positions and dwell on the length of the "probation" period before leaders occupy elective positions especially at higher levels.

We begin first with the experiences the leaders have acquired at various levels of party organization. As table 3.8 shows, of the entire leadership, only 8.2 per cent have the experience of working at the grass-root of the party organization; 17.0 per cent have worked at the intermediate level, i.e., between the grass-root and the district levels; and 66.2 per cent, 53.2 per cent and 16.4 per cent have worked at the district, state and national levels of party organizations respectively. A rather large proportion of leaders with organizational experience at the district and the state levels may

TABLE 3.8  
Party Positions at Different Levels of Party Organization

Level of Party Organization	Local Level	Block/ Mandal Constituency Level	District Level	State Level	National Level	Never in Party	N
Party Affiliation							
INC	5.4	22.4	74.1	46.0	17.0		352
SWA	2.0	8.2	57.1	73.5	14.3		49
BJS	19.8	14.0	68.6	44.2	9.3		86
CPM	—	11.8	64.7	47.1	17.6		17
CPI	2.8	5.6	50.0	88.9	22.2		36
Socialist Parties	2.1	12.5	64.6	59.1	14.6		48
INC (O)	11.8	17.2	64.6	59.1	22.6		93
Splinter Congress Parties	12.7	9.1	60.0	61.8	18.2		55
DMK	29.2	33.3	70.8	70.8	—		24
Other Parties	7.4	3.7	65.6	63.0	14.8		27
Non-Party	—	13.0	17.3	13.0	21.7	47.8	23
N	66	148	537	431	133	11	810
%	(8.2)	(17.0)	(66.2)	(53.2)	(16.4)	(1.4)	

perhaps be an artifact of the sampling device in the sense that leaders belonging to assembly constituency and above constitute the sample. However, the fact remains that the leaders having grass-root and local level organizational experience constitute a very small proportion of political leadership. This leads to two interesting inferences. First, those who start at grass-root levels have lesser chances of moving up in the leadership hierarchy. Second, those who start at higher levels have more opportunities for upward career mobility.

There is not much variation across parties except that the DMK and the Jana Sangh come out better in that they provide better opportunities for leaders to go up over the hierarchical ladder of party organization even when they start from the bottom as compared to their counterparts in other parties.

We move on to discuss leaders' experience in different elective governmental institutions (see table 3.9). In contrast to experiences in party organization, experience of elective positions provides a smoother picture. Note, for example, that as much as 30.5 per cent of the sample have the experience of working either at the village Panchayat level or at the town/city government level. Similarly, 11.5 per cent have an experience at the block level and 15.7 per cent, 51.6 per cent and 16.4 per cent respectively at the district state and national levels.

Once again, the DMK surpasses all other parties in that a very large number of its leaders have the experience of having worked at the local government level. This is perhaps due to its local and regional character. Significantly, a large number of leaders, cutting across party lines, have governmental experience at the state level. This is due perhaps to the fact that more than half of our sample is composed of those who have been the members of the state legislature at one time or the other.

The overwhelming number of state legislators in the sample has the effect of swelling the ranks of those who have

TABLE 3.9

**Experience at Different Levels of Elective Bodies**

<i>Levels of Government</i>		<i>Local level</i>	<i>Block level</i>	<i>Distt. level</i>	<i>State level</i>	<i>National level</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Party</i>	<i>Affiliation</i>						
INC		32.4	14.5	26.7	52.3	21.2	352
SWA		34.7	12.2	8.2	46.9	18.4	49
BJS		26.7	—	2.3	37.2	8.1	86
CPM		41.2	—	—	41.1	23.5	17
CPI		16.7	2.8	2.8	61.1	8.3	36
Socialist Parties		33.3	6.2	12.5	72.9	10.4	48
INC (O)		31.2	12.9	11.8	41.3	6.5	93
Splinter Congress Parties		29.1	18.2	9.1	56.4	10.9	55
DMK		45.8	12.5	4.2	70.8	8.3	24
Other Parties		25.9	22.2	7.4	65.6	11.1	27
Non-Party		4.3	4.3	4.3	30.4	21.7	23
N		247	93	127	418	132	810
Total	%	(30.5)	(11.5)	(15.7)	(51.6)	(16.4)	

the experience of working at different levels in various institutions, both party and governmental. That is, once a person is elected to state legislature or to the Parliament he automatically becomes an ex-officio member of many governmental and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, it is pertinent to single out all the legislators and the parliamentarians from the rest of the sample and see what positions they held prior to or at the time of entering the State legislature and/or Parliament. Table 3.10 summarizes the findings.

It is surprising to note that only 174 (41.6 per cent) out of 418 current or past members of the state legislators in our sample have first hand experience of the functioning of government at one level or the other. Similar is the case with the parliamentarians as well. Considering the importance of the highest elective body in a representational system, the lack of the experience of governmental agencies in the case of as much as 38.3 per cent of the representatives entering the Parliament is quite revealing. Moreover, a closer scrutiny suggests that of the 81 parliamentarians as many as 61 have experience only at the state level. What is thus reflected is that the parliamentarians as well as the legislators lack the experience at the local levels of government. This undoubtedly forcefully supports Arora's observation that

lack of experience at the local levels of government does indicate that the gap between the villagers and the national elite must still be considered a severe handicap to the effective functioning of our political system.<sup>14</sup>

For, this lack of governmental experience at the lower levels is an indication of the lack of orientation towards problems of the people and the functioning of the system at the grass-root. Cooptation of leaders who do not rise from the ranks for positions at the apex of the institutional structure means not only that they have no experience of the functioning of the

14. Satish K. Arora, "Social Background of the Fifth Lok Sabha", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 31-33, Special Number, August, 1973.

TABLE 3.10  
Elective and Organizational Experience Prior to Entering State Legislature of Parliament

Party	L E G I S L A T O R S			No. of Legislators	P A R L I A M E N T A R I A N S			No. of Parliamentarians
	Have Elective Experience	Have Party Experience			Have Elective Experience	Have Party Experience		
INC	51.6	62.0		184	62.3	83.1		77
SWA	43.5	56.5		23	20.0	50.0		10
BJS	34.4	62.5		32	33.3	55.6		9
CPM	37.5	75.0		8	50.0	75.0		4
CPI	27.3	63.6		22	33.3	66.7		3
Socialist Parties	28.6	68.6		35	100.0	100.0		5
INC (O)	36.4	56.8		44	57.1	71.4		7
Splinter Congress Parties	25.8	45.2		31	100.0	85.7		7
DMK	35.3	88.2		17	50.0	50.0		2
Other Parties	60.0	66.7		15	33.3	33.3		3
Non-Party	—	42.9		7	80.0	40.0		5
Total	N	174	258	418	81	100		132
%		(41.6)	(61.7)	(100.0)	(61.7)	(75.9)		(100.0)

system but also that they lack mass contact as well as appropriate perspective on problems at the grass-root. This phenomenon has an important bearing on the functioning of the representative system.

In regard to organizational experience the situation is not that bad as in the case of governmental experience. Roughly, two-thirds and more than three-fourths of the legislators and the parliamentarians respectively are exposed to the functioning of their respective party organizations (see Table 3.10). It can be argued that the lack of experience with governmental institutions may partly be compensated by the experience of working at various levels of the party organization. But it should be pointed out that these leaders, too, have organizational experience mostly at the state level.

Such a significant proportion of leaders entering state legislatures and the parliament without any prior experience of handling public offices imposes serious constraints on the effective functioning of the political system at large, on the one hand, and raises doubts about the fairness in distribution of rewards to genuine party workers by different parties, on the other. It is generally believed that people who are greatly rewarded in politics are those who are well connected with the higher-ups, on the one hand, and are socio-economically better off than their counterparts in the organization, on the other. Does this belief have any validity?

We examine this question in Table 3.11. It contains two sets of information. First set (A and B) presents information on ordinary experience i.e. the number of years spent in the party before one occupies position in the party organization under each of the SES category. The second set (C and D) deals with organizational experience i.e. years spent in holding different positions in the party prior to entering the state Assembly and in the Parliament again with reference to each of the SES category.<sup>15</sup>

15. For further details see note 1, Appendix IV.



TABLE 3.11  
Number of Years Spent in Party/Party Positions to Get Organizational and Legislative Position (in Percent)\*

	S O C I O - E C O N O M I C S T A T U S			
	Low	Middle	High	Total
<i>Experience Prior to Holding Different Posts in Party and Government</i>				
A. Years spent in party prior to holding position in party at <i>District level and below</i>				
Upto 5 years	32.1	35.9	42.1	36.2
6 to 10 years	16.7	15.8	19.1	17.0
11 to 20 years	27.8	32.1	24.6	28.3
20 years and more	23.4	16.3	14.2	18.5
N	252 (39.1)	209 (32.5)	183 (28.4)	644 (100.0)
<i>B. Years spent in party prior to holding position in party at State and National levels</i>				
Up to 5 years	20.2	34.2	36.9	29.5
6 to 10 years	18.1	12.8	17.7	16.2
11 to 20 years	32.0	24.2	26.2	27.8
20 years and more	29.7	28.9	19.2	26.5
N	178 (39.0)	149 (32.6)	130 (28.4)	457 (100.0)

C. Experience in different party posts prior to entering into State Legislature	No experience	32.9	33.0	48.2	37.5
	Up to 5 years	36.9	35.9	29.6	35.1
	6 to 10 years	17.4	16.0	13.0	14.9
	11 to 20 years	11.4	11.3	8.3	10.5
	20 years and more	1.3	3.8	0.9	2.0
	N	149 (41.1)	106 (29.2)	108 (29.7)	363 (100.0)
D. Experience in different party posts prior to entering into Parliament	No experience	18.7	20.0	30.8	23.4
	Up to 5 years	18.7	27.5	41.0	29.8
	6 to 10 years	37.5	20.0	12.8	22.5
	11 to 20 years	15.6	15.0	15.4	15.3
	20 years and more	9.5	17.5	—	9.0
	N	32 (28.8)	40 (36.0)	39 (35.1)	111 (100.0)

\*Percentage are calculated columnwise.

Two distinct patterns are discernible from the table. First, among the less experienced position holders whether in party or in the legislature, the high SES leaders have a definite edge over the low SES leaders. For example, in the category 'upto 5 years experience', there are only 32.1 per cent position holders from the 'low SES' group as against 42.1 per cent from the 'high SES' group (see table 3.11). Similar is the trend in the case of state legislature and the Parliament. That is, while only 20.2 per cent of leaders from 'low SES' were inducted into party positions at the state and national levels, 36.9 per cent of leaders from 'high SES' acquired similar position after a wait of 5 years. In respect of the state legislature the corresponding figures are respectively 32.9 per cent and 48.2 per cent and with regard to parliament, 18.7 per cent from 'low SES' and 30.8 per cent from 'High SES' respectively.

And, second, in the categories of more experienced (20 years and more) the proportions of position holders are invariably high among the 'low SES' group as against in the 'high SES' group. For example, in the category of '20 years or more experience' there are 23.4 per cent position holders from the 'low SES' as against only 14.2 per cent from the 'high SES'. The same is the case with B, C and D also. That is, the share goes down respectively from 29.7 per cent to 19.2 per cent, from 1.3 per cent to 0.9 per cent and from 9.5 per cent to nil.

What is thus suggested makes a very interesting commentary on the current Indian political leadership. That is, both experience and the SES play quite an important role in contributing to leader's advancement in his political career. While the high SES people are disproportionately rewarded for their overall position in the society, the leaders with low SES background have to heavily bank upon their long period of service to their respective party to compensate for their lower SES and to compete with the better offs on an equal footing to strive

for what is due to them.<sup>16</sup>

We may now summarize the important factors that our analysis reveals to be very significantly associated with the career of Indian leadership. First, the socio-economic background has a very crucial bearing on the recruitment pattern of the political leaders. A particular note should be taken of the fact that most of the leaders in our sample have grown in fairly well-educated and politically-involved or active families. Second, not all the leaders come from the upper strata of society. At least a section of leadership is drawn from those socio-economic groups that are ranked low on one or the other SES indicators. However, a composite view of all relevant socio-economic indicators shows that there are very few who are low on all the indicators. This suggests that the leadership positions are mostly filled by people belonging to the 'pool of eligibles.

Third, a majority of 'older generation' leaders entered politics through the nationalist movement. However, of the 'newcomers', a majority joined politics due to their personal inclination and concern for socio-economic conditions of the area and the people. Similarly, the 'older generation' leaders came into politics through the Congress Party (undivided). However, the 'newcomers' are either mobilized through the Socialist parties and minor regional and local parties or the parties i.e. the Jana Sangh, the DMK, that came into existence after independence.

Fourth, Indian leaders seem to lack the experience of working in party organization and public offices at the grass-

16. Marvick's study of the 1967 Indian Political activists also suggests more or less a similar finding. That is although he has not used a composite index of SES, his observation about leaders' education and occupation suggest that the larger proportions of position holders from the low ranking on both these indicators are found in the lower levels of the party organization, however, the trends are reversed for the higher positions, "Recruitment Pattern...", *op. cit.*, table 6.11, p. 157.

root level. This is bound to severely handicap the leadership in the effective functioning of our political system. This is true for the state legislators as well as for the parliamentarians.

And, finally, the socio-economic status which have been singularly important in the initial recruitment of leaders play an equally important role in influencing further advancement in their political careers.

## **Value Profile of Indian Leaders**

Our discussion in the preceding two chapters highlighted some of the salient features of political leaders, their recruitment and their socialization in politics. We focussed particularly on the origin of leaders, i.e. characteristics of socio-economic 'pool of eligibles' from which the leaders were drawn and the 'opportunity structure' that facilitated the process of recruitment and political mobility. Such a discussion deepens our understanding of the "givens" that influence the recruitment and mobility of political leaders to be sure. However, they do not offer a complete sketch of leadership attributes.

The answer to question why does a leader behave the way he does? does not lie merely in his antecedents or in the socio-economic background. We need to go beyond socio-economic background of the leaders and focus on some of the important attributes that leaders acquire in the process of their development. These attributes are not inborn, though they are influenced by socio-economic milieu of the leaders. In fact, these attributes are learned and acquired, inculcated or

generated by a host of external factors e.g. childhood training, peer-group socialization, schooling, etc. as well as experiences acquired and training received during the course of political apprenticeship. While a leader passes through all this he develops certain orientations, norms of behaviour, ways of looking at things and expectations from life. These are the various dimensions of human motivation that shape the individual's attitudinal disposition and value orientation.

Since we are dealing with political leaders' behaviour in public life, our interest lies in social values and their role in shaping the behaviour of leaders. By social values we mean the standards or principles a leader has imbibed in himself and uses them in order to make choices from among several alternatives available to him in his social and political life. This acts as normative considerations in influencing his behaviour and the manner he behaves. Sources of values are different for different persons. It is so primarily because,

specific values are learned, acquired through the multiple life experiences that people go through. They can therefore, be extremely diversified and individuals may, as a result of their particular mix of personal experiences, come to hold particular values that, if not unique, are not shared by many others. On the other hand, where groups of people have similar experiences, common values tend to emerge.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, the multiplicity of the individual's life experiences, on the one hand, and the diversity of roles one has to perform as a member of different groups and institutions, on the other, give rise to different set of values—sometimes in conflict with each other—in the same person. Under the circumstances where such conflicts arise one chooses an alternative course of action by setting priority to either of the values one may choose in-action as the best possible

1. Philip E. Jacob, "Values and Public vitality: The Political Dynamics of Community Activeness," in P.E. Jacob (ed.), *Values and the Active Community: A Crossnational Study of the Influence of Local Leadership* (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 8

alternative. Setting priorities and opting for the best alternative course of action, particularly in a situation when two sets of values come into conflict with each other, put anybody in a very trying situation. The courses one decides to choose in such situations are not random but are most likely to be rationalized and governed by the larger system of values. What we mean here by the larger value system is a composite structure of values which emerges as a result of inter-play of values that one has imbibed in himself.

This is precisely the context in which we propose to examine values of our leaders and political activists. The values that we focus on are those that are relevant for locating leaders in the matrix of democratic and socialistic values. For this purpose, we discuss, four sets of values, viz; authoritarian orientation, social harmony, national commitment and radicalism.

The reason why we select these values is our supposition that in a democratic polity leaders ought to be democratic in their outlook as well as behaviour. That is, they should be less authoritative in decision-making and should favourably be disposed to popular decision-making. While working for programme achievement they should also show concerns for social harmony and avoidance of conflict in the society. They should be more nationalistic rather than parochial in outlook; and over and above all these, they should, by keeping themselves in tune with the socialistic posture of constitutional democracy, have greater preference for economic equality and an egalitarian socio-economic order.<sup>2</sup>

2. Guided by the above considerations, the value we would examine are the following:

VALUES	QUESTION NUMBERS
(a) Authoritarianism versus Popular participation in decision-making;	65.3, 65.6, 65.9 and 65.12
(b) Social harmony or conflict avoidance versus Programme achievement;	65.2, 65.5, 65.8 and 65.11
(c) National commitment versus local goals and objectives;	65.1, 65.4, 65.7 and 65.10
(d) Radicalism versus Conservatism;	20, 21, 22, 26 and 27

(Contd. on next page)



## I

## A. Authoritarianism

To a great extent, leadership's commitment to broaden the decision-making base strengthens 'the shell' of democratic polity. Conversely, a leadership favouring exclusiveness and monopoly of power is likely to erode the bases of a democratic polity. For want of better terms, we may characterize the former as 'democratic', and the latter as 'authoritarian'. Opposite views are expressed in relation to these two. One view holds that for an effective functioning of a democratic system, decision-making should entirely be left in the hands of a limited vanguard of the competent and committed leadership. In contrast to this, it is argued that popular participation in decision-making infuses social responsibility among the people and generates greater response and cooperation. Popular participation is a *sine qua non* when decisions affect people's life and where their help and cooperation is expected for carrying through implementation. That is, it is normal human nature that it generally does not respond to someone else's decisions as vigorously as it does to decisions.

(Contd. from previous page)

While proceeding with the discussion we propose to deal with each of the aforesaid values separately. To ascertain leaders' stand on specific values, a set of questions was administered to each of our respondents to elicit their views on various aspects of the same value position. In order to smoothen our discussion and gain clarity, we have divided the present discussion into two sections. The first part is mainly descriptive. That is, in this section we have dealt with two things: first, a general discussion on each value; and second, a description of various items (questions) constituting a value and distribution of our leaders on the items in the same value. The second part is mainly exploratory. To begin with, we have constructed a scale for each of the values separately. Since each value consists of many questions, construction of scale became necessary to give a composite picture of one's position on a given value. Having constructed the scale, an effort has been made to relate the leaders' value position with their party affiliation and social background, on the one hand, and inter-value relationships on the other. By doing so we have tried to find out if there exists a value system and its implications on the larger system of our democratic polity.

does to decisions one feels personally responsible for. Both these views are important and have merits and demerits attached to them.<sup>3</sup>

While efficiency may be sometimes 'high' where decision-making is limited to fewer individuals and 'low' where decision-making is more-broad-based, we believe that on the average, the latter provides a better environment for the sustenance of a democratic system. And, in this, the role of political leaders at all levels, particularly at lower levels, becomes especially crucial for they influence the relationship between democracy (and the distribution of power within it) and social order. That is, they constitute the main linkage between the government and the people. Effective discharge of such roles are possible only when the leaders give due credence to public opinion. Giving credence to public opinion and formulating decisions accordingly may, in some sense, amount to accepting peoples' participation in decision-making.

How do the leaders in our sample view popular participation in decision-making? Table 4.1 presents relevant data.<sup>4</sup>

3. For a detailed discussion on the issue see Lester, W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company 1965).
4. In order to tap authoritarianism among our leaders a set of four questions were administered. Of the four items there are three statements which are negatively worded and one is positive i.e. the first, second and fourth statements say that the people's participation in decision-making activities is not desirable while the third says that the popular participation is necessary. Though all the four items were intended to measure the leaders' preference for popular participation in decision-making there are qualitative differences in emphasis used in each statement. For example, the first statement is very general and says that 'decision-making need not be the concern of all people'; the second statement emphasises the trustworthiness and competence of leaders and puts a justification for not involving the general people in decision-making; the third favours participation even at the cost of time and expenditure; however, the fourth says that 'allowing people's participation in decision-making is inviting interference in getting things done; see question numbers 65.3, 65.6, 65.9 and 65.12 in Appendix I.

TABLE 4.1  
Distribution of Responses for Items Measuring Authoritarianism\*  
(N=807)

<i>Items</i>	<i>Response Categories</i>				
	<i>Strongly Agree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Strongly Disagree</i>	<i>Total D.K. and N.A.</i>
1. Decision-making need not be the concern of all people,	9.4	44.2	36.9	6.6	2.9 100.0
2. People's participation is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of trusted and component leaders.	15.1	51.8	23.7	6.8	2.6 100.0
3. Participation of all citizens is necessary even if it takes a lot of time and expenditure.	15.4	39.2	36.7	5.7	3.0 100.0
4. Allowing many people to have their say will only interfere with getting things done.	9.2	40.3	41.0	6.6	2.9 100.0

\*For exact wording of the questions used here and in subsequent tables, see Appendix I

As would be seen in table 4.1 a little variations in emphasis used in questions have accordingly influenced our leaders' stand on various items. For example, the number of cases disfavouring popular participation occurs in response to the second statement which asks the leaders to make choice between decision being left in the hands of a few trusted and competent leaders and the people's participation. Apart from this, irrespective of variations in emphasis the pattern of responses has not been affected to any considerable extent. Dichotomizing the responses of the leaders, we find that the leaders are more or less equally divided. That is, a slightly less than half of them favour popular participation in decision-making and a little more than half say that their (people's) participation is not desirable.

Two things are apparent. First, the fact that very few cases fall in extreme response categories shows that the views held by leaders on the issue of popular participation in decision-making is not very strong—neither against nor in favour of. And, second, the leadership is more or less equally divided between those who welcome people's participation in decision-making on the one hand and those who do not, on the other. How these two groups are different from each other and what factors are most likely to influence particular views that the leaders hold require further inquiry. We will return to it later.

## **B. Social Harmony or Conflict Avoidance**

Social harmony is generally considered to be one of the most desired values that a good public leader should give allegiance to. Similarly, parties serve as safety valves in the resolution of conflicts through integration of interests and consensus formation at all levels. The leaders and parties have to work for the general well-being of the society and have also to constantly strive for minimising the divisive potentialities which certain programmes may create or accentuate. That is, they have to evolve developmental strategies so that no section may feel unduly threatened with or aggrieved at. It is a very difficult proposition particularly in the context of developing countries where the leadership is extensively

burdened with designing of various developmental programmes to get quicker results. This is problematic because of the multiple responsibilities they have to perform. That is, while evolving a developmental programme they have to evaluate it in terms of its cost-benefit analysis as well as in terms of its implication for the maintenance of social harmony. And as such the leaders in a responsive political system tend to continually evaluate programmes of change in terms of their implications for social harmony.

The task is undoubtedly difficult but nonetheless an important one. It needs to be constantly taken care of if alienation is to be avoided and the social integration of the community is to be maintained. What is thus meant is that the task of programme design is made difficult and involves greater pains on the part of the decision-makers. That is, while designing a programme, social harmony is to be considered as one of the cost factors involving two things; one, the programme should be least controversial for which the public support must be solicited; and, two, even if there are some reservations in certain sections of the society, due efforts ought to be made to mobilize general support accordingly. This is possible only if there is strong concern among the leaders for the maintenance of social harmony as well as firm commitment to the attainment of developmental goals.

As it is, there is, as table 4.2 reveals, an over-whelming support for the maintenance of social harmony on the part of the leaders in our sample. In none of the items we find less than 60 per cent preference for the value of social harmony. For example, 72.7 per cent ("strongly agree" 25.4 per cent and "agree" 47.3 per cent) of leaders hold that 'a good leader should refrain from making proposals that divide the people even if these are important for the community'. Similarly, more than 61.1 per cent of leaders perceive the maintenance of social harmony as more important than carrying through the developmental programmes of the community. As against this, not more than one third of them perceive that the achievement of the community programmes should be given more weightage than the maintenance of social harmony.

TABLE 4.2  
Distribution of Responses for Items Measuring Social Harmony  
(N=807)

Items	Response Categories					Total
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	D.K. & N.A.	
1. A good leader should refrain from making proposals that divide the people even if these are important for the community.	25.4	47.3	19.5	5.3	2.5	100.0
2. Any decision that threatens to alienate a sector or group in the community should be postponed.	17.5	52.2	22.3	3.1	4.9	100.0
3. Perceiving harmony in the community should be considered more important than the achievement of community programmes.	11.8	48.8	30.9	4.5	4.0	100.0
4. If there is disagreement about a programme, a leader should be willing to give it up.	8.6	52.5	27.1	6.7	5.7	100.0

It is thus clear, that the perception of social harmony and concern for conflict avoidance is quite strong among Indian leaders. What implications does it have in regard to informing their view point on various issues concerning radical economic changes and equitable distribution of the means of production would be of great interest to explore. We return to it later.

### C. National Commitment

The term—national commitment—is used here in a local national perspective. And we propose to examine leader's orientation to national interest and goals, as against localism and local interests. In a representational system the representatives are drawn from different socio-geographical and political units with a view that they would represent their respective constituencies and the constituents. This puts a moral responsibility on the leaders to look after the interests of their respective constituents. But if the leaders are concerned exclusively with local needs and problems the growth of the nation as a whole and the achievement of the national goals would perhaps go by default. In fact, in political matters, as Etzioni puts it, "commitment to a sub (local) unit is not dysfunctional so long as loyalty to (larger) community is dominant—that is, in a case of conflict of loyalties, loyalty to the (larger) community is more powerful than loyalty to a sub (local) unit.<sup>5</sup> It is so argued because the leaders entrusted with the task of decision-making have to take into consideration a broader perspective and think of the nation as a whole. This applies particularly to leaders who occupy positions in various apex bodies of decision-making.

This presents on its face value a very conflicting situation to any leader in the performance of his role. That is, a local representative has dual functions; on the one hand, he has to look after the interests of the locality he represents and, he has to participate in decision-making bodies whose decisions, more often than not, affect a larger entity than his own constituency on the other. But how often does one face such

5. Amitai Etzioni, *The Active Society* (New York, : Free Press, 1968), p. 555.

dilemmas? One would perhaps argue that in reality such situations are very few. According to some leaders even the perception of conflict between the local and national objectives is erroneous. They rather "insist that there can be genuine harmony between local and national interests."<sup>6</sup> This may be true in an advanced society like America's but does not seem quite applicable to India where collectivities in almost every field of society—social, economic or geographical—suffer from a persistent feeling of relative deprivation. And the leaders are under a constant pressure from their respective constituents to redress these deficiencies. However, the resources available for development are scarce and hopelessly insufficient to meet local and parochial demands. In such a situation a leader has to develop a national perspective and evaluate the needs and problems of his locality accordingly. Though the conflict between the local and national interests and goals is not very frequent a national perspective is needed where the situation demands it.

It does not mean that the local needs and problems have to be ignored by the leadership. In fact, the parts make the whole and if these are developed the whole would also benefit. But while attending to local needs and requirements the leaders have to bear in mind the principle of equitable distribution, and, instead of adopting a parochial view, they have to be prepared to give precedence to national over local interests. How far do leaders in our sample give allegiance to national interests?

As Table 4.3 reveals, a very large number of the leaders in our sample give preference to the furtherance and protection of national interests as against local interests. Note, for example, that as much as 85 per cent of leaders state that national goals should always receive priority over the requirement of the local community. Similarly, 78 per cent of leaders would not agree to the statement that one should not worry so much about national problems when there are so many in the

6. This finding refers to American leaders, see K.K. Singh, *et. al.*, "Pattern of Commitment," in Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 76.



TABLE 4.3  
Distribution of Responses for Items Measuring National Commitment  
(N=807)

Items	Response Categories				
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Total D.K. & N.A.
1. National goals should always receive priority over the requirement of the local community.	37.4	48.1	9.5	1.2	3.8 100.0
2. In case of conflict the needs of the local community should receive preference over national objectives.	6.9	26.1	47.8	15.6	3.6 100.0
3. We should not worry so much about national problems when we have so many in our own community.	2.7	15.7	61.8	16.2	3.6 100.0
4. Although national affairs are important, people here should first worry about their own community.	6.6	29.6	49.8	9.3	4.7 100.0

local community. Thus, it is clear that a large majority of Indian leaders give preference to national over local interests. However, it should also be noted that more than one-third of the leaders in our sample prefer to give priority to local interests as against national interests. Note, for example, that 33 per cent of leaders refuse to accept the priority of national interest over local interest. Similarly, 36.2 per cent of leaders are willing to worry first about their own community even though national affairs are important.

#### D. Radicalism

We now turn to discussing the ideological orientation of Indian leaders. We focus particularly on accentuation of radicalism in Indian politics in the recent years. The term radicalism is used here in a limited sense. It intends to tap only economic aspects of leader's radical orientation and focuses on control over economy and distribution of property and means of production. The growth of politicalization and political consciousness among the vast citizenry, on the one hand, and inequality in economic and power relationships, on the other, have accentuated the phenomenon of radicalism in Indian politics. Of late, it has manifested in an assertion and aggressive pursuit of sectional interest especially by groups and individuals who have hitherto been underprivileged or deprived in the traditional power and economic structures. "It also represents," as Sheth observes "a rejection of the norms that were central to the traditional hierarchical and inequitable social order." Viewed in this perspective, he further observes "radicalism, thus sanctions use of state power as well as collective group power for attaining social and economic equality."<sup>7</sup> It is against this background that we explore the phenomenon of radicalism among Indian Leaders.<sup>8</sup>

7. D.L. Sheth, "Structure of Indian Radicalism," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. X, Nos. 5-7, Annual Number, February 1975, p. 327.

8. We adopt the method of analysis used by Sheth, while he uses cross-section data, the present study is based on Elite data from 1971 Election samples. For further discussion on the subject see: Sheth, *Ibid.*

As table 4.4 indicates, the five items selected to tap the phenomenon of radicalism do not represent a unidimensional scale. Although all of them intend to tap the content of radicalism, the dimensions they cover are not one and the same. For example, the first three items focus on eliciting leaders' views on policy formulation and evaluation of governmental measures already taken but, of course, within the limit of the law of the land. However, the last two items are something which might go beyond the limits of the constitutional democracy. And thus put together, they indicate two dimensions of radicalism which, following Sheth,<sup>9</sup> we may call Legislative radicalism and Direct-action radicalism.

One of the most important issues that has widely been discussed in Indian politics is that of how much control should the government exercise on the country's economy. The question of control on economy has been central to all of our economic planning since Independence. A leftist overtone in the split of the Indian National Congress in 1969 further sharply focussed on this issue, and it acquired greater significance during the 1971 elections. In order to understand the direction sought to be given to the economy, we have to see how the leaders—both in power as well as in opposition—reacted to this and, by and large, what positions they took. Viewed in this context, table 4.4 suggests that there is a greater support for control over economy. That is, roughly 64 per cent of Indian leaders favour control as against only 24.6 per cent who express their opinion against it. In addition, 10 per cent of leaders approve control on one sector and not others.<sup>10</sup>

Similarly, in the case of bank nationalization as many as 67.2 per cent of our leaders approve the measure taken by the government as against only 17.6 per cent who disapprove this

9. Sheth, *op. cit.*

10. This gets further support from the data collected from the citizen sample. For example, Sheth's study shows that 37.5 per cent approve the control over economy as against 36.7 per cent who disapprove it and the rest do not have any opinion on the issue, *Ibid.*

act. Apart from this, there are 14.3 per cent who approve of the measure but express doubts about its likely efficacy.<sup>11</sup>

Next we come to the need and desirability of legislation to limit the ownership of land and property. This again, like control on economy, became a focal point in the then ongoing political debate. Constitutional safeguards, viz, right to property, on the one hand, and goals of socialism, on the other, provided the main stuff of debate for or against limiting ownership of land and property. It is interesting to note that except for 12.5 per cent of leaders, all support the need of legislation to limit the ownership of land and property.<sup>12</sup>

The last two items in the table aim at ascertaining leaders' views on the desirability of direct action as a means of resolving socio-economic problems. "The emphasis here," as Sheth puts, "is on confronting the authority structures through direct action with popular demands towards the goal of socio-economic equality, instead of achieving it by legislative reforms only."<sup>13</sup> Of the two, the former attempts to measure the legitimacy of protest behaviour i.e. demonstrations strikes, gheraos, etc. for meeting the demands of the people, while the latter brings into focus the propriety and desirability of directly occupying the land and property of those who possess much. In both the cases the leadership, by and large, rejects the idea of direct action. The movement (e.g. grab land and property) which was launched by a section of people in different parts of the country seems to have acquired very little support among the leadership. Only 17.9 per cent of our sample favour the movement as against 79.9 per cent who oppose it. It means that the leadership is perhaps fully aware of the implications it

11. In the case of cross-section data although more than two-thirds of them were completely unaware of the issue, of the 31.8 per cent who expressed their opinion as much as 23.4 per cent approved the measure taken by the government, *Ibid.*

12. As far as the popular view is concerned the cross-section data also suggest a similar consensus (70.1 per cent approve and 14.6 per cent disapprove, however, 15.3 per cent fail to give any opinion on it, *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

TABLE 4.4  
Distribution of Responses for Items Measuring Radicalism  
(N=807)

<i>Issues</i>	<i>Response Categories</i>			
	<i>Approve</i>	<i>Approve with some reservations</i>	<i>Disapprove</i>	<i>D.K. &amp; N.A.</i>
1. Government should exercise greater control over industries, trade and agriculture.	63.9	9.6	24.6	1.9
2. Bank nationalization was proper,	67.2	14.3	17.6	0.9
				100.0
				100.0

3. Government should pass legislation to limit the ownership of land and property.	84.9	2.0	12.5	0.6	100.0
4. Demonstrations, strikes, gheraos etc. are proper to get attention of those in authority.	3.14	22.5	45.6	0.5	100.0
5. People with no land and property should occupy a part of land and property of those having large amount of land and property.	17.9	2.1	79.9	0.1	100.0

**Note:** Bold Figures in the table show two separate dimensions, namely, Legislative radicalism and Direct action radicalism.

would have for the existing order of society.<sup>14</sup> In so far as extra-constitutional means of protest are concerned, while 31.4 per cent of leaders feel that the recourse to demonstrations, strikes, gheraos, etc. is proper for putting pressure on the government for responding to the needs of the people and solving their problems, 45.6 per cent of leaders thought otherwise. However, there is another sizeable group of leaders (22.5 per cent) who accepted the propriety of the protest behaviour if it was for a just cause and non-violent in nature.<sup>15</sup>

## II

We have so far been concerned with the ideological orientation of the leaders in our sample taking each of the items separately. We now turn to examine this by means of scales<sup>16</sup> in order to get a composite picture. Table 4.5 shows the distribution of leaders against various value scales. Not surprisingly, Indian leaders manifest a high degree of sensibility in regard to the values of social harmony, national commitment and legislative radicalism.<sup>17</sup> Note, for example, that 46.9 per cent of leaders score high on the scale of social harmony, 55.6 per cent on national commitment and 45.2 per cent on legislative radicalism. Interestingly, on all the three scales the second largest group falls in the middle category with only 16.7 per cent, 12.7 per cent and 25.5 per cent falling in the low category respectively. In the case of authoritarianism, the majority of leaders fall on the lower side of the scale. That is,

14. This consideration alone perhaps explains the variation between the views of the leaders and that of the ordinary citizens. In the case of citizen sample data majority of respondents support the move. That is, according to Sheth's study, 47.0 per cent approved the move as against 42.3 per cent of those who disapproved it, *Ibid.*

15. Almost similar findings are reported in the case of citizen sample data, *Ibid.*

16. For a detailed note on construction of scale see note 2, Appendix IV.

17. Findings of this table (table 4.5) are well in tune with what we discussed earlier by way of item-wise analysis. What is thus reflected is that the items included to measure a desired value form a coherent group. Inter-item correlation within each value scale show that each of them contributes significantly and these form a scale. For factor-loadings and other details see tables 4 to 7, Appendix III.

TABLE 4.5  
Distribution of Leaders on Four Value Scales

<i>Value</i>	<i>High</i>	<i>Middle</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>N*</i>
Authoritarianism	26.4	40.0	33.6	768
Social Harmony	46.9	36.5	16.6	732
National Commitment	55.6	31.8	12.6	743
Legislative Radicalism	45.2	29.3	25.5	784
Direct Action Radicalism	15.7	42.6	41.7	805

\* Total number of cases do not add up to 810 and N varies from value to value because of elimination of 'not ascertained' and 'do not know' type of answers in any one of the items included to construct a scale.

33.6 per cent disfavour authoritarian outlook as against 26.4 per cent in favour of it. Of course, the inflated middle category confuses the issue. However, it underlines the fact that the salience of authoritarian streak in Indian leadership cannot be ignored. As far as direct action radicalism is concerned, the majority of leaders score low on this scale. This stands in contrast (though not very sharply) to the legislative radicalism. What these two dimensions of radicalism thus indicate is that there is greater amount of agreement on radical orientation of the Indian leaders as long as this does not come into conflict with constitutional propriety. Such an agreement does not obtain when it comes to affecting the existing social order and inter-group relationship *vis-a-vis* the government.

The pattern of distribution of cases in different categories of various scales leads us to further explore; first, whether leaders in different parties behave differentially on different



TABLE 4.6  
Mean Value Score for Parties

Value Score	Authoritarianism	Social harmony	National Commitment	Legislative Radicalism	Direct Action Radicalism
Party					
INC	10.4	11.1	11.8	2.6	0.6
SWA	10.8	11.8	10.4	0.7	0.6
BJS	10.7	11.6	12.6	1.2	0.7
CPM	8.5	10.6	12.3	2.8	2.0
CPI	8.6	10.5	12.0	2.9	1.8
Socialist Parties	9.2	10.9	11.2	2.6	1.5
INC (O)	10.1	11.8	11.4	1.6	0.6
Splinter Congress Parties	10.4	10.8	10.5	1.7	0.7
DMK	10.6	11.6	10.2	2.2	0.4
Other Parties	10.3	11.3	11.8	1.6	0.6
Non-Party	10.2	10.9	11.7	1.8	0.7
Total	10.2	11.2	11.6	2.1	0.7
N	768	732	743	784	805

scales and, second, what relationship exists between leaders' social and political positions and their outlooks on various measures of value orientation. We first present the mean score on each value for individual parties (see table 4.6).

Three distinct patterns emerge from the above presentation. First, we find that the left parties—the communists and socialists—form a group across values by themselves. They disfavour authoritarian values and come in support of radical measures, both legislative as well as direct-action. Second, the right parties i.e. the Swatantra and the Jana Sangh are high on authoritarian scale and occupy lower position on radicalism. And, finally, the parties in power including the Congress (O) and the DMK once a ruling party in one of the Indian states, adopt more or less a middle path on almost all the values, of course, with an exception that the DMK scores lowest on national commitment.

Two additional things need to be noted here. First, Jana Sangh's highest score on the value of national commitment speaks of its nationalist posture; the Communist parties also fare quite well on this measure which distinguishes them from other minor and regional parties and prove their claim of being national parties. Second, the lowest score by the DMK on direct-action radicalism perhaps indicates its caution, least it is accused of disturbing the existing social order. Or, looked differently, this again would support our hypothesis that the parties in power, by and large, stand for status-quo. This is further substantiated when we find that they score high on social harmony as well.

To conclude, our data suggest three important patterns. First, social values of the Indian leaders are, more or less, in a socially desired direction. Second, leaders belonging to different parties evince different configurations of values. For example, if the left parties score high (mean value score) on national commitment and on both dimensions of radicalism, the right parties score high on social harmony. And, finally, authoritarianism seems to have positive relationships with parties having enjoyed or enjoying the fruits of power.

## **Leaders' Views on System Legitimacy, Decentralization and Democratic Rights**

Thus far, we have dealt with the socio-economic profile of Indian leaders, their recruitment, career pattern, mobilization, political socialization as well as the values imbibed by them. No doubt, such explorations yield valuable informations about the factors that have shaped the career patterns of political leaders. However, by themselves they remain incomplete unless supplemented by information pertaining to the leaders' perception of the way the political system as a whole functions or should function. Crucial to our understanding of the existing political system is the extent of acceptance it enjoys among the leaders as well as the people. The survival and/or sustenance of any political system depends basically on how much confidence and trust leaders and their constituents have in it. Questions pertaining to the credibility of the system and the confidence it inspires in the leaders as well as the people assume greater importance in respect of parliamentary democracy where different conflicting interests compete with each other for control of power. What paths these groups

choose in order to gain power is largely guided by their own assessment about the meaningfulness of the existing political order. How far would the competing elites go in their bid to capture power—would they restrict their conflicts ‘*within* the norms of regime’ and adhere to rules of the game? or (in case the conflicts are ‘*about* or *concerning* the regime’), would they still follow the rules of the game or transgress the consensual limits by adopting extraconstitutional means to overthrow the established regime?<sup>1</sup> The nub of the matter lies in how much faith and confidence these competing groups and parties have in the system.

Indian political system has been under extreme stress in the post-Nehru period. At one end of the spectrum there have been the parties of the extreme left which question the very basis of parliamentary democracy and electoral processes. At the other end are parties and groups which, though subscribing to the parliamentary democracy in principle and practice, openly express dissatisfaction with the existing electoral laws.<sup>2</sup> This as well as other complaints against the system require us to assess the views of our leaders on this issue.

Related to this is the question of how should power be distributed among various echelons of our federal system. The centre-periphery issue is known to be a vexing one in all plural-participatory democracies. But in a federal polity like ours it has assumed critical importance because consensus on many of the basic issues was getting gradually eroded. During

1. For a detailed discussion on conflict ‘*within* the ‘regime’ and conflict ‘*about* or *concerning* the regime’ see Maurice Duverger, *The India of Politics: The Uses of Power in Society* (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1966), pp. 150-160.
2. A section of the CPM raised a voice against taking part in elections. This was later capitalized by the Naxalites. Similarly, the growing popularity of the Jana Sangh party in Northern India and yet its defeat by the Congress with a small margin of votes created great hue and cry against the existing electoral laws and pleas for change preferably with a proportional representational system were made. The issue was joined also by persons like Jaya Prakash Narayan and a committee was set-up to look into the matter during the pre-emergency days.

the last few years the need for decentralization of power has acutely been felt by a section of politicians as well as by some serious scholars of Indian politics.<sup>3</sup> Keeping this aspect of our system in mind we propose to examine leaders' views on distribution of power between the Centre and the State on the one hand and allocation of power to the Panchayati Raj on the other.

And, finally, the aberration that the system recently experienced (the emergency phase) makes it necessary to explore the extent to which Indian leaders are committed to the preservation of democratic norms. Developments leading to the proclamation of Emergency and the arguments generally put forth in support of it were quite disconcerting in the sense that they challenged some basic premises of democratic polity. Opinions were sharply divided relating to the necessity of putting curbs on democratic rights for rapid economic development. In fact, the radical thrust had made a considerable advance by 1971. The issues like nationalization of banks and abolition of privy purses formed the main bone of contention during the 1971 general elections. In addition, certain radical sections of the then leadership went a step further, and demanded the removal of such constitutional provisions which came in the way of rapid economic development and accomplishment of a socialist society. Against this background, the steps taken by the then Prime Minister have to be examined in relation to the opinion the leadership has had during the 1971 elections. How the leaders in our sample are distributed on the issue of curtailment of the

3. Janata Party's Manifesto on Elections to Lok Sabha, March 1977, specifically makes a case for decentralization of power. And among the notable scholars pleading for decentralization is Rajni Kothari. According to him one of the major shortcomings of the Indian system has been a great concentration of power at the centre and too much dependence on the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's secretariat. In one of his articles (*Seminar*, 197, January, 1976) he even pleads for District Councils. For further details, see Rajni Kothari, *Democratic Polity and Social Change in India: Crisis and Opportunities* (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1976), and "Design for an Alternative", *Seminar*, 216, August, 1977.

TABLE 5.1  
Distribution of Leaders on Three Items of Legitimacy  
(N=810)

<i>Questions</i>	<i>Responses</i>	<i>No. of cases</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
1. Have parties and elections been a help or hindrance in the economic development of the country.	Hindered	136	16.8
	Hindered but must be retained	11	1.4
	Qualified answers helped	42	5.2
	Neither helped nor hindered	589	72.7
	Don't know and not ascertained	13	1.6
2. Can the government in this country be run better if there were no parties, assemblies and elections ?	Yes	19	2.3
	Qualified answers	71	8.8
	No	12	1.5
	Don't know and not ascertained	711	87.8
3. Are elections the proper means to decide (determine) who should govern the country or the leaders should not be elected but selected on the basis of their merit ?	Selected on merit	16	1.9
	Qualified answers	58	7.1
	Elected as now	80	9.9
	Don't know and not ascertained	661	81.6
		11	1.4

democratic rights would provide us with a realistic assessment of the situation that was existing during that period and, of course, it would also shed some light on the way the system has shaped since then.

### Legitimacy of the System

To begin with, we first take the question of 'legitimacy' and examine our leaders in respect to their views on questions pertaining to legitimacy of our existing political system.<sup>4</sup>

As Table 5.1 reveals, there exists a fair amount of support for maintaining or continuing the existing party system and elections. For example, a large proportion (72.7 per cent) of leaders in our sample clearly affirm that parties and elections have been a great help in achieving the goals of economic development. As against this, there are only 16.8 per cent of leaders who strongly feel that these have hindered the pace of development.

Similarly, on questions 'Can the government in this country be run better if there were no parties, assemblies and elections,' and 'Are elections the proper means to decide (determine) who should govern the country or the leaders should not be elected but selected on the basis of their merit' our leaders come overwhelmingly in support of the existing institutional order. That is, 87.8 per cent and 81.6 per cent have favoured the existing system of governance and means of choosing the representatives respectively. In contradistinction to this there hardly exists any opposition to the present constitutional order—only 8.8 per cent felt that the government could be run better without parties, assemblies and elections and only 7.1 per cent have recommended selection of leaders

4. In order to examine system's legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of Indian leaders, the leaders' opinions were solicited in regard to utility of parties and elections for achieving the goals of economic development; running of government without parties, assemblies and elections; and viability of the existing electoral laws and the election system.

TABLE 5.2  
Party Affiliation of Leaders Expressing Doubts about the Present System  
(in per cent)

<i>Views on system legitimacy</i>	<i>Parties &amp; elections have been hindrance in the economic development of the country</i>	<i>Govt. in this country can be run better if there were no parties, assemblies &amp; elections</i>	<i>Elections are not proper means to decide who should govern the country</i>
<i>Party</i>			
INC	13.8	8.2	10.7
SWA	27.1	14.9	27.1
BJS	23.5	5.8	22.1
CPM	12.5	11.8	1.8
CPI	2.9	2.9	11.4
Socialist Parties	12.5	12.5	22.9
INC (O)	26.4	19.4	25.0
Splinter Congress Parties	17.6	12.7	20.0
DMK	4.2	20.8	25.0
Other Parties	28.0	—	29.6
Non-party	33.3	17.4	17.4
Total	17.4	10.4	17.3



on the basis of merit as against the existing system of electing the representatives.

There is no doubt that a large proportion of Indian leaders supports the present institutional structure. However, a sizeable number of leaders does raise questions about the desirability of the existing institutional structure. It is of interest to see which parties do such leaders belong to.<sup>5</sup> Relevant data are presented in table 5.2.

Three general observations are discernible from table 5.2. First, a clear-cut distinction emerges between those who are in power and those who are out of it, (Proportions of Congress leaders expressing dissatisfaction with the existing system are always lower than the national average). Second, parties with closer ties with the party in power also adopt, more or less, similar positions as that of the party in power (see, for example the case of CPI). And, finally, parties having better organisational strength are more inclined to express faith in the party system. The case of CPM party provides an excellent example of this.

### Decentralization

In so far as the issue of decentralization is concerned, we are confronted with two diametrically opposite views on the subject. On the one end, there is a group of people who very strongly feel that the central authority must be strengthened and allowed to wield more power to effectively deal with 'threats' both external as well as internal. On the other side, however, there are people who favour decentralization; they criticize the protagonists of centralized polity for their obsession with the fear that decentralization would lead to the disinte-

5. In order to examine party affiliation of leaders expressing reservations about the viability of the existing system, we shall first dichotomise responses to all these three questions into two groups: one, expressing doubts about the system; and, second, considering worthwhileness in continuing of the existing system. Responses, which do not fall in any one of these two clear-cut groups are excluded from this exercise.

gration of the society. As Kothari notes :

What such a belief overlooks is the fact that the only durable unity that has been built in this country during more than a thousand years is the one since independence, a unity that recognized diversity and dissent and open competition for power. The so-called divisive forces of regionalism, language, caste and even religion were politicised and through politicization made part of a common framework of involvement and participation, not excluding hard bargaining and open expression of conflicts and tensions.<sup>6</sup>

He further argues :

...the mechanistic view that any transfer of power and resources to lower levels means a 'weakening of the centre' should be given up as both fallacious and dangerous (how dangerous it proved to be was seen during the emergency and in the events leading upto the Emergency). In point of fact, allowing the states and local units to perform functions which can be carried out only there and managing the conflicts and tensions which arise in the process will reduce the load on the centre, disaggregate crisis management so that demands and discontent are contained at local levels and do not aggregate upward.<sup>7</sup>

The Major theme of Kothari's argument centres around the idea of institutionalizing a system of decentralization that allows the grass-root units of political organization to influence policies at the higher levels including the apex body of decision-making and not *vice-versa*. The introduction of Panchayati Raj system in India was, in fact, a good beginning in this direction. But the power delegated to the Panchayats as well as the resources at their disposal were so minimal that they could never enjoy autonomy and, therefore, they became

6. Kothari, "Design for an Alternative," *op. cit.*, p. 16.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 17. And for a detailed discussion on the 'disaggregated' conception of the political system, see his book *Politics in India* (New Delhi : Orient Longmans, 1970) Chapter IV.

ineffective in most of the Indian states. Of course, Gujarat and Maharashtra prove to be exceptions because the Panchayats in these states have enjoyed better status, as against their counterparts in the rest of the country. In the same way, in the centre-state relations, there is a considerable imbalance in the power relationship—that is, the centre has appropriated more powers than perhaps necessary in a federal polity.

Similarly, there are states of large sizes and small sizes. One of the major hurdles in the way of development of certain backward areas has been the perennial neglect of these regions due to the political manipulation by the advanced regions. Telengana in Andhra Pradesh, Eastern and Kumaon regions in Uttar Pradesh, North and Chhota Nagpur regions in Bihar, and Marathawada in Maharashtra illustrate this. This discrimination, it is argued, is particularly fostered in large-sized states. The rapid development that has taken place in the state of Haryana after bifurcation of Punjab is cited as an example of smaller states doing better than the large ones. Thus, the unwieldy size of some states and even the districts has, it is suggested, hampered the process of development. Moreover, the reduction of the size of states will put at ease those who always see the bug-bears of threats to national integration, for smaller units (even with more powers) perhaps could not pose any serious threat to central authority. Further, small states would be able to accommodate ambitious leaders at local levels in the state apparatus much more easily. To the extent that it happens, it will take care of lack of efficacy which many leaders suffer from.

How far these considerations weigh with Indian leaders? Table 5.3 presents some information in this regard.<sup>8</sup>

8. Although the questions included here do not measure to our requirement in all its specifications, yet we feel that these can yield some clue to the problem. Leaders' views were solicited against the following questions: "Should the states be given more power?", "Should Panchayati Raj be given more powers and functions than it has today?", and "Is it desirable to have smaller and more numerous states or should the large states remain as they are?"

TABLE 5.3  
Distribution of Leaders on Three Issues of Decentralization  
(N=810)

<i>Q u e s t i o n s</i>	<i>R e s p o n s e s</i>	<i>No. of cases</i>	<i>P e r c e n t a g e</i>
1. Should the state governments be given more powers or should the Central Government have more powers ?	State Government more powers	260	32.1
	No change	156	19.3
	Qualified answers	82	10.1
	Central Government more powers.	300	37.1
	Don't know and not ascertained	12	1.4

2. Is it desirable to have smaller and more numerous states or should the large states remain as they are ?	Smaller states desirable Remain as they are States should be of equal size Larger states Don't know and not ascertained etc.	222 405 18 101 64	27.4 50.1 2.2 12.5 7.8
3. Should the Panchayati Raj be given more powers and functions than it has today, present powers should be maintained, or should their powers be curtailed ?	More powers Maintain present power Curtail powers Panchayats should be abolished Don't know, not ascertained etc.	412 167 164 15 52	51.1 20.7 20.3 1.9 6.0

In so far as the question of distribution of powers between the state and the central governments is concerned, opinion is, more or less, equally divided between those favouring more powers to the state governments and those wanting more powers to stay with the centre. That is, of the total, 31.1 per cent recommend more powers to the state governments and 37.1 per cent to the centre. In addition, there exists a fairly sizeable group (10.1 per cent) which pleads for re-allocation of power. It does not question the centre's supremacy but wants the state governments to enjoy greater autonomy in managing their own affairs. However, another substantive group (19.3 per cent) of leaders does not feel any need to alter the present power-equations between the states and the centre.

One thing needs to be noted in this connection. Those who favour greater autonomy to states without challenging the supremacy of the centre together with those who give unqualified support to the idea of greater autonomy to states, constitute 42.2 per cent of the leaders in our sample. As against this, more than half (56.4 per cent) of the leaders—37.1 per cent of leaders advocating greater concentration of powers in the hands of the central government and 19.3 per cent of those who favour the maintenance of the status quo—will perhaps act as counterveiling force in any move towards decentralization. But it depends on how strong and united they are and to what extent they will go to make a concerted effort to frustrate such a move. Answer to both these lies in who they are? We shall return to this question later. In the meantime, we turn to discussing the viewpoint of Indian leaders in respect of the appropriate size of states and devolution of power to Panchayats.

Quite interestingly, only 27.4 per cent of leaders in our sample feel the desirability of smaller states. Even if one is to include those who have advocated equal sized states (meaning thereby splitting of larger states) the proportion does not increase by more than 2.2 per cent. On the other hand, 50.1 per cent of leaders do not want to disturb the present setting.

Add to them those (12.5 per cent) who prefer even large size-states.

In regard to the devolution of more powers to the Panchayati Raj, a majority of our leaders (51.1 per cent) favour this. As against this, only 20.3 per cent said that its powers should be curtailed and 20.7 per cent preferred a status quo. In addition, also interesting is the fact that 15 leaders (1.9 per cent) went as far as recommending the abolition of the Panchayati Raj itself.

We can now turn to analyzing the antecedence of those who support decentralization. This we propose to do by locating the parties these leaders come from.

While no distinct pattern is discernible from table 5.4, some interesting points can be noted. For example, the Jana Sangh emerges as the party most opposed to decentralization. That is, more than two thirds of its members advocate more powers to the central government. It is in sharp contrast even to the Congress Party—the then party in power.

As far as the desirability of smaller states and devolution of more powers to the Panchayats are concerned once again the Jana Sangh stands out. It opposes decentralization more than any other party. While its preference for larger states is rooted in its theory of nationalism, the insistence on the part of 38.4 per cent of its leaders to curtail the powers of Panchayati Raj speaks for its urban bias. In contrast, left parties (Communists and Socialists) and the DMK seem to be quite favourably disposed towards decentralization.

It should be noted that compared to those who oppose decentralization, the leaders who support decentralization certainly constitute a large group. The Congress, which constitutes the single largest group, is favourably disposed towards the idea of smaller states and support giving more powers to Panchayats.

TABLE 5.4  
Party Affiliation of Leaders Opposed to Decentralization  
(in per cent)\*

Party	Recommend more power to Centre	Larger States Desirable	Recommend curtailment of powers to panchayat Raj
INC	44.9	13.1	13.9
SWA	20.4	10.2	32.7
BJS	67.4	25.6	38.4
CPM	—	—	17.6
CPI	13.9	2.8	25.0
Socialist Parties	14.6	2.1	10.4
INC (O)	40.9	19.4	28.0
Splinter Congress Parties	20.0	12.7	29.1
DMK	—	—	8.3
Other Parties	14.8	3.7	40.7
Non-Party	39.1	—	39.1
Total	37.0	12.5	22.1

\* Percentages here represent share of such leaders in each party.



### Curbs on Democratic Rights

Economic development and democracy are said to have very close relationship. On one extreme there are scholars like Duverger and Lipset who do not visualize democracy functioning successfully in under-developed countries. They argue that one of the correlates of the successful functioning of democracy is a higher level of economic development. Further, others feel that democracy provides too much freedom to individuals and interest groups and their tendency to self aggrandizement creates obstacles in achieving rapid economic development. But experience specially that of India does not lend any credence to these views. The proponents of these views:

... play into the hands of the critics of democracy. They ignore the great progress in economic and social change in India, the establishment of a unified and integrated society and the accomplishment of a remarkable fusion of traditional and modern values in a spirit of justice and freedom. True, democracy in India had its excess, but the system was fundamentally sound. It was only through the 'open society' political pluralism and through competitive party politics that integration, legitimacy and social progress were achieved. Those who would argue otherwise should only look at Pakistan. In emphasizing India's failure in economic policies in recent years one ignores the tremendous progress made earlier under the democratic constitution.<sup>9</sup>

This is true. However, the imposition of emergency gave the impression that the 'operators of the system' were convinced that economic development and democratic rights cannot go together. Therefore, the putting of curbs on democratic rights

<sup>9</sup>. Samuel J. Eldersveld and Bashiruddin Ahmed, *Citizens and Politics: Mass Political Behaviour in India*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 294. See also Rajni Kothari, "Restoring the Political Process," *Seminar*, July 1976. For further, theoretical objection, see, Ramashray Roy, *Social Diversity, Economic Development, and National Integration*, (Mimeo).

in order to achieve rapid economic development was felt necessary. Can we trace the seed of this view point at least back to the time when the survey on which this study is based was conducted? Keeping this in mind the main survey included a question: 'Should democratic rights be curbed if they come in the way of rapid economic development.'<sup>10</sup> Answers to this question (see Table 5.5) may also give us a clue to the support extended to the then Prime Minister in imposing emergency and suspending democratic rights.

TABLE 5.5

**Distribution of Leaders on the Issue of Democratic Rights**

<i>Question</i>	<i>Responses</i>	<i>No. of Cases</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Should democratic rights be curbed for achieving rapid economic development?	Curb rights	322	39.9
	Qualified answers	13	1.5
	No Curbs	416	51.4
	Perceive no conflict	45	5.6
	Don't know, not ascertained	14	1.6

Although the majority of our leaders (51.4 per cent) are against the curtailment of democratic rights, a sizeable proportion of leaders (41.4 per cent) prefer curbs. In addition, 5.6 per cent of leaders do not perceive any conflict between economic development and democratic rights. It is of interest in this context to find out the party affiliation of leaders expressing one view or the other.

As can be seen from Table 5.6, the CPM leadership tops the list in so far as the question of putting curbs on democratic rights to achieve rapid economic development is concerned, even though it favours popular participation in decision-

<sup>10</sup> See question 39 in Appendix I.

TABLE 5.6  
Leaders View on Democratic Rights and their Party Affiliation  
(in per cent)

Party	Views on Democratic Rights			N
	Support Curbs	Oppose Curbs	Perceive no Conflict	D.K., N.A. etc.
INC	51.1	38.1	8.8	2.2
SWA	12.2	83.7	4.1	—
BJS	14.0	77.9	5.8	2.3
CPM	58.8	29.4	5.9	5.9
CPI	30.6	50.0	19.4	—
Socialist Parties	45.9	49.9	2.1	2.1
INC (O)	25.8	69.9	3.2	1.1
Splinter Congress Parties	38.2	50.9	9.1	1.8
DMK	54.2	45.8	—	—
Other Parties	37.0	59.3	—	3.7
Non-Party	52.2	30.4	17.4	—
Total	41.4	51.4	5.6	1.6
				100.0

making. Equally significant is the stand taken by the Swatantra, the Jana Sangh, and the Congress (O) parties, of which 83.7 per cent, 77.9 per cent and 69.9 per cent respectively oppose any curbs, though they were seen earlier to manifest authoritarian orientation. (See Table 4.6, Chapter IV). This only reflects the ideological inconsistencies reflected in these parties. The CPM has always stood for socialization of means of production and distribution while the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra opt for liberal economic policies. What is of more interest is the stand taken by the then two allies—the CPI and the DMK—of the Congress party in 1971. While 54.2 per cent of the DMK leaders support curbs, only 30.6 per cent of the CPI leaders do so. It is true that 51.4 per cent of leaders in the sample oppose curbs on democratic rights. However, the fact that 41.4 per cent of leaders in all and a majority of Congress leaders (51.1 per cent) advocate curtailment of democratic rights for speeding up economic development explain the ease with which Mrs. Gandhi could proceed with authoritarian measures.

The putting curbs on democratic rights, whether for economic development or otherwise, is no doubt constitutes an authoritarian measure, particularly in a democratic polity. Can this be explained in terms of a strong relationship between the leaders' authoritarian values and their stand on curbing democratic rights? Our data suggest (table 5.7) that there

TABLE 5.7  
*Authoritarianism and Curbs on Democratic Rights*  
 (in per cent)

<i>Democratic Rights</i>	<i>Support</i>	<i>Oppose</i>	<i>Perceive</i>	<i>U.K. &amp;</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Authoritarianism</i>	<i>Curbs</i>	<i>Curbs</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>N. A.</i>	
			<i>Conflict</i>		
High	47.3	47.3	4.9	0.5	203
Middle	40.1	54.1	4.2	1.6	307
Low	39.6	53.9	5.8	0.8	258
Total	41.8	52.2	4.9	1.0	768




FIGURE 5.1: PROGRESS TRENDS & CROSS-SECTION PEOPLE EXPRESSING UNFAVOURABLE VIEWS ON ISSUES OF LEGITIMACY AND DECENTRALIZATION.

exists a positive but very weak relationship between the two. Note, for example, that as we move from "high" to "low" authoritarianism, the proportion of those who support curbs decreases.

One of the assumptions underlying the successful and effective functioning of democracy is that there should exist a fair amount of concordance of values between leaders and citizens. In case there exists no such concordance, a democratic political system is likely to be characterized either by the self-aggrandizing tendency of elites or rebelliousness of citizens. As figure 5.1 suggests, there exists a great amount of concordance between the value preference of leaders and citizens except in the case of legitimacy of elections. Of course, there are differences in degree—both in positive as well as in negative sense. For example, in regard to both the aspects of legitimacy, viz. the possibility of a better government without parties, assemblies and elections, and the method of choosing leaders, the general population does not seem to be as satisfied as the leaders. This is bound to be the case because legitimacy of the system is a function of the feeling of efficacy. The more efficacious one feels the greater legitimacy he would attach to the system. Since ordinary people are, by and large, less efficacious than leaders, their (people's) perception of the system's legitimacy would be low. We should also note that only 14.8 per cent of the cross-section as against 10.3 per cent of the leaders feel that the government in this country can be run better if there were no parties, assemblies and elections. In the case of the existing method of choosing representatives, 33.6 per cent of the cross-section population suggests change as against only 17.0 per cent of leaders.

As far as the question of decentralization is concerned, citizens evince more favourable response than the leaders. Only 27.8 per cent as against 37.1 per cent of leaders recommend more powers to the central government. The same is the case with appropriate size of states.

To conclude, the existing political system enjoys a fair amount of acceptance both among the leaders as well as the

people. A little criticism that we have found may still be lessened in due course of time, particularly with the changed political climate and the political groups emerging therefrom. Second, with the kind of distribution and division we have seen in regard to decentralization, one may hopefully discern that the prospects for a decentralized federal polity are fairly bright. Third, although the majority of our leaders show an unquestioned regard to the preservice of democratic rights, there exists some reservation in certain sections of our leadership which have to be cautiously dealt with. And, finally, a fair amount of concurrence of views between the leaders and that of the cross-section of people is indicative of the fact that the leadership fulfills the requirement of being representative of the people and represent the concerns of the people at least on the items against which comparable data are available.

## An Overview

We have been concerned in the present study mainly with the analysis of the characteristics of Indian leadership and its value orientations. In doing so, we restricted our attention to studying political leaders only. As stated earlier, we did so primarily for two reasons: First, it is the political elite who has a direct access to power and can influence decision-making and the setting of social goals in a more effective manner than any other elite. Second, in a democracy no other interaction is as important or intense as that between the masses and the political leaders.

Study of political leaders, particularly in a parliamentary democracy, would perhaps be a futile exercise if it failed to give due considerations to political parties. For, political parties while mobilizing and recruiting political aspirants into politics by providing institutional means for political participation also serve as powerful links between the people and the government. In addition, they play an important part in educating the vast citizenry, particularly in the area of political modernization, in articulation of interests and grievances of the people, in integrating individuals and wide varieties of socio-economic groups into the mainstream of



national political life, in bridging gaps within and between various sub-units of the society, and generally in contributing to the growth and development of the nation. Therefore, for a better understanding of leaders it is imperative to study them in relation to their respective parties and in a wider perspective of the political system as a whole.

In this context, the role of elections also becomes quite significant. That is, although, political leaders and parties are supposedly busy in the pursuance of their goals and objectives during the periods between elections, it is, in fact, elections, particularly the general election, during which the best of all the parties and leaders is generally seen in the public. And, thus, the leaders constituting the principal, *dramatis personae* of election-politics and electioneering enjoy a definite edge over others, either by directly occupying legislative positions or by having substantial hold over those whose entry they facilitate into the state legislature or the parliament. It is these considerations that have influenced and guided this study of Indian political leaders active and/or emerging during the 1971 parliamentary elections. Keeping these into consideration the present inquiry has attempted the exploration of some of the issues pertaining to the Indian leadership in a wider context. In brief, we have tried to examine social origins of Indian leaders; their recruitment and socialization into politics; socio-economic composition of leaders in different political parties, career pattern, mobility and achievement of leaders; socio-political values they adhere to and the sources of such adherence; the stand leaders take on some crucial issues like legitimacy of the existing political system, decentralization of powers and regard for democratic rights etc, all of which have meaningful bearings on the continuance and maintenance of the existing political system; and, finally, the gap, if any, between the leaders and the masses on some of the current salient political issues.

We now turn to piecing together some of the more important findings in regard to each of these facets and try to see what conclusions we may draw from them.

## Social Profile of Leaders and Parties

In a democratic polity implications of political recruitment have far-reaching consequences for the successful functioning of the system. Ideally speaking, in a democracy power is to be equally shared by all. However, in practice power may or may not be shared equally. Although accountable to the masses, leaders enjoy much more power than the masses they represent. It is this empirical fact of unequal access to power and its sources that makes the recruitment process a critical aspect of the system. Because if the power is not equally shared between the leaders and the masses, there should at least exist a principle of equality and an opportunity structure which may facilitate access to power positions for all who are so inclined.

To meet this requirement, the principle of recruitment of leaders must be open and, in effect, the leaders must be recruited from different social strata on the basis of individual merits. Or in a Lasswellian sense, "leaders must be drawn from the community at large, rather than from a few social strata."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, giving representation to wide segments of society, in a sense, minimises the feeling of frustration coupled with a sense of powerlessness among the vast majority of the general population, on the one hand, and maximises the understanding of the leadership about the interests and problems of the people in general on the other.

Theoretical assumptions are one thing; but empirical reality is another. Our data show that the upper strata of society enjoy an overwhelming advantage in filling various political posts both in party organizations and in legislatures. We also find that the leaders in our sample consist mainly of people belonging to older age groups, mostly male, highly educated, high castes, large farmers, professionals—mainly lawyers, big businessmen, and urban based. As our sample includes leaders occupying positions at the assembly consti-

1. Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1943), p. 109.

tuency level and above, a little bias in favour of older age-groups was perhaps, in-built in the sample design itself. However, the leaders in our sample are fairly equally-distributed in different age categories. But that women's-representation is quite meagre (only 2.2 per cent) indicate that women lag far behind the males as far as taking active part in politics is concerned.

Our data also show a grass under-representation of less-educated or illiterate and an increasing trend in recruiting more-and more educated people in politics. This is no doubt indicative of the fact that ascriptive attributes, which have singularly been important in determining power positions in the past, are perhaps being gradually replaced by acquired characteristics and individual merits of a person. But such an inference gets weakened to some extent when we consider the fact that leadership positions are mainly filled by people belonging to upper echelons in the caste hierarchy. That is, those who were traditionally high on the caste hierarchies also happen to enjoy the fruits of the new system-education, being: certainly the one of them, becomes, at least for the time-being, instrumental in perpetuating the hold of traditionally dominant socio-economic groups in modern politics.

Similar is the case with the domination of people from urban areas. Reasons are fairly obvious. Urban people by virtue of their location in an urban setting, enjoy greater advantage than those living in far flung and remote hinterland. They have been the first to get exposed to modernization and westernization. This has facilitated their induction into politics. And this also explains the early domination of professionals—particularly the lawyers—in politics. But the picture seems to be changing now. The distribution of leaders in different occupational categories clearly indicates this. In fact, farmers and not the lawyers or business people now constitute the largest group.

Comparison across parties also reveals, more or less, a similar pattern. By and large, all parties seem to be dominated

by people from upper social strata. However, there are also certain dissimilarities across parties. That is, some of them have greater representation of older leaders, more educated, urban—both in terms of residence as well as in occupational categories, and upper castes than other parties. For example, the average age of leaders in the CPM is 51.3 years followed by the CPI (49.5 years). However, the DMK leadership appears to be the youngest as far as the average age of its leaders is concerned. The Jana Sangh has more than 70 per cent of its leaders educated beyond college level; 52.3 per cent of its leaders are drawn from professions; 72.1 per cent of them have lived mostly in towns and cities; and it has drawn more than 80 per cent of its leaders from upper castes only. While the socio-economic background of Jana Sangh leaders points to its narrow base of support which is heavily biased in favour of urban and upper castes, the support bases of the Socialist parties are rural and middle castes. As far as the Congress party is concerned, its social composition seems to be more representative as compared to other parties.

As we have already seen, both the Communist parties have almost a majority of their leaders as full-time social and political workers. Along with the Socialists and the DMK, the majority of the Communist leaders are drawn from low income groups. In other words, the mean incomes of the leaders of these parties are much below the national average. In contrast, the Swatantra emerges as the party of big-farmers: an average of 121 acres of land holding of its leaders as against 5.7 acres for the CPM and 45.1 acres as the national average. Similarly, the mean income of the Swatantra leaders is Rs 2194, followed by the Congress(O). The recruitment bases of different parties as revealed by our data seem to be indicative of a left-right divide in the support structure of at least some parties. For example, the leaders belonging to lower income groups and low and middle castes are found more in Communist and Socialist parties. In contrast, the leadership of the Jana Sangh, the Swatantra and to some extent, also of the Congress(O) belongs to upper castes and upper income groups.

### Political Socialization

Our discussion of the socio-economic profile of Indian leaders suggests that while democracy assumes an open system of political recruitment, there are in fact facilitating as well as constraining forces that help or hinder one's entry into politics. The operation of these forces brings into existence a socio-economic pool of eligibles which functions as a catchment area for the recruitment of leaders. This pool is largely constituted by the upper strata of society. This is true for almost all the systems. However, our data reveal that there, in fact, exists a group, though a small one, which does not belong to this pool. This led us to explore two things : first, how different are the leaders in this group from those in the pool of eligibles. And, second, if they are different, what helps them in their entry into politics ?

Taking education, income, land holding and caste status singly, we find that out of 810 leaders, 92, 131, 266 and 128 respectively fall outside the pool. However, on a composite measure only 34 leaders happen to be out side of the pool, followed by 27, 75 and 274 who fall out on three, two and one indicators respectively. This confirms our earlier proposition that leaders are, by and large, recruited from upper socio-economic strata which in all probability form a pool of eligibles. It is this pool that meets the rising demand for leaders resulting from the expanding political opportunity structure in the society.

In so far as the factors that help the entry into politics of leaders outside the pool, we examined in particular their early socialization. We found that, of the 34 leaders who clearly fall outside the pool of eligibles, 17 have grown in politically active families, that is, their fathers or some other members of their family were interested and/or active in politics. This is also the case with the majority of leaders in our sample. They have grown in educated families and as high as 62.8 per cent of our leaders have been brought up in families where some of the family members have already been interested and/or

active in politics. Another interesting observation pertains to the fact that the proportion of leaders with relatives in politics is quite sizeable.

### **Political Mobilization**

In addition to socialization, there are other forces which impel people to join politics. The fact that not everybody belonging to the pool of eligibles joins politics nor everybody receiving similar socialization enters politics compels us to look for some other motivating factors.

Our data suggest that more than one third of the leaders in our sample have joined politics through their participation in the freedom movement. For leaders falling in upper age brackets the crucial importance of freedom-movement as a motivating factor for entering into politics is not surprising. For the beginning of mass-political culture in India coincides with freedom movement when the masses were mobilized in politics. Another motivating factor has been the leaders' concern for socio-economic conditions of the people. For example, 25.7 per cent of leaders joined politics ostensibly to improve the conditions of the society and the people. The third motivating factor is either the personal inclination and disposition of leaders or their links with some organization or the fact that some relatives of theirs were already in politics. What is surprising is that very few leaders have mentioned ideology, policies and programmes as motivating factors for joining politics.

Comparing across parties, we find that, while the majority of leaders in older parties were motivated to enter politics through freedom movement, in newer parties, concern for socio-economic conditions of society and personal inclinations of leaders appear to be the major reasons for their entry into politics. It is in the case of CPM that roughly one fourth of its leaders joined politics for ideological considerations.

**Pattern of political career**

A majority of leaders in both the Congress parties—INC and INC(O)—along with the Communists and Socialists, joined some party before 1947, while the rest did so in the post-independent era of mass politics, especially during elections. On further examination it appears that, except the Jana Sangh and the DMK, roughly half of the leaders of all the non-Congress parties came to their present respective parties from the undivided Congress. Next are the Socialists and the leaders of other minor and regional parties. Even though they have not been successful in retaining leaders they recruited, they have helped in mobilizing leaders from various sections of the society. However, all parties have been affected by the phenomenon of defection. But the Socialists, followed by the Swatantra, the DMK, and other parties have been affected most by this phenomenon.

In so far as the experience of the leaders in our sample is concerned, our data indicate that a fairly large number of our leaders have the experience of working in the grass root level government. The lack of experiences in party organisations at the grass root is perhaps due to the ineffectiveness or, in some case, non-existence of party organisations at that level. It is only in the DMK followed by the Jana Sangh that a large number of leaders have worked in the grass-root party organization. In terms of experience of government offices, the second place is occupied by the CPM. Of course, the DMK is on the top in this respect as well.

Although a large number of legislators and parliamentarians have work experiences in lower elective bodies, a good proportion of them are inexperienced (58.4 per cent in case of legislators and 34.3 per cent in the case of parliamentarians). And this unevenness in the experience of our state and national level leaders might be considered, as Arora suggests, "a severe handicap to the effective functioning of our political system."<sup>2</sup>

2. Sa'ish K. Arora, "Social Background of the Fifth Lok Sabha," *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. VIII, Nos. 31-33, Special Number, August, 1973.

The socio-economic status of the leaders is an important factor not only in the recruitment of leaders but also in the leaders' upward mobility.

### Value Profile

In so far as the value profile of the leaders in our sample is concerned, we focussed on four important values—authoritarianism, social harmony, national commitment, and radicalism. Our data indicate that except for authoritarianism and direct action radicalism the majority of our leaders rank high on the rest of values. For example, 46.9 per cent, 55.6 per cent and 45.2 per cent of our leaders are ranked high on social harmony, national commitment and legislative radicalism respectively. The low ranking of leaders on direct-action radicalism indicates lesser propensity to accept actions that come in conflict with the established law of the land. However, a fairly high (but not the highest) ranking of authoritarianism scale shows a slightly lesser acceptance of popular participation in decision making. Moreover, the largest single group of leaders fall in the middle category, indicating that even though propensity to authoritarianism is there, its expressions are mild and, even the right kind of atmosphere, it might change.

Using the same information across parties, we find that if the left parties score high on national commitment and radicalism—both the legislative as well as direct-action—the right parties score high on authoritarianism and social harmony.

In addition, we have also tried to see the roots or sources of these values. The socio-economic status, leaders' ideological position and their experiences in parties and government are some of the most important factors in shaping their views on various social values. It is of interest to note that the leaders' own placement on ideological space-continuum appears to be the most important factor in influencing his values. Institutional experiences are the second and socio-economic status, which happens to be very important in recruitment and promotion in political career, is the least effective as far as its role in shaping of leaders' values is concerned.



### **Legitimacy**

Irrespective of their party affiliation, the leaders in our sample have expressed an overwhelming support for the existing political system. For example, 72.7 per cent have said that the parties and elections have helped in the economic development of the country. Similarly, 87.8 per cent and 81.6 per cent have supported the present form of government and elections respectively. What little discontent we see does not appear to inform any sizeable group. Note, for example, that not more than 30 per cent of leaders in any party have expressed discontentment with the existing system.

### **Decentralization**

In contradistinction to the overwhelming confirmation of legitimacy, the leaders' support for decentralization of power is quite fragmented. Except for giving more powers to Panchayati Raj, on none of the other items we find a majority of leaders coming out in support of decentralization. While 37.1 per cent of our leaders recommend more powers to the Centre as against 32.1 per cent in favour of the state governments, a majority (50.1 per cent) of leaders favour *status-quo* in respect of the desirability of having smaller states. A comparison across parties suggests that, except for the Jana Sangh, the majority opinion among leaders of other parties is against more powers to the Centre. Similarly, a composite scale of all the items together once again places the Jana Sangh on the top so far as opposition to decentralization is concerned. The Congress(O) occupies the second place.

### **Democratic Rights**

Regarding the conflict between democratic rights and rapid economic development, we come across, more or less, an equally divided opinion on the part of our leaders. Roughly 40 per cent of the leaders feel the need of putting curbs on democratic rights as against 51.4 per cent who stand firmly against any such curbs. It is pertinent to note that the

majority of the CPM leadership is in favour of curbs on democratic rights to achieve faster economic development, while Jana Sangh and Swatantra leaders have expressed the opposite views.

On the whole, the findings of the present inquiry suggest that, despite their origin from the upper socio-economic strata of the society, the views of the leaders in our sample on major issues concerning the political system are, more or less, in accordance with the views and concerns of those whom they represent. For example, a good deal of concordance is found between the leaders and the masses with respect to radicalism, legitimacy and decentralization.

### Conclusion

On the basis of the preceding discussion, we are led to several broad conclusions. First, political leadership in India is dominated by upper segments of society. Notwithstanding the fact that there appears to be a change in the recruitment pattern—ascriptive attributes are gradually being replaced by acquired merits, particularly, education—it is quite apparent that the same old and established traditional socio-economic interests have retained a lead in modern leadership roles as well. In most of the cases, only labels have changed. The traditional Mukhia of the village (village-headman) has become the Pradhan (president of the village Panchayat). The ex-talukedars and land-lords have come to inhabit the upper levels of Panchayati Raj and legislative bodies. In this, their traditional control over material and other resources has helped them. That is, with the expansion of modern educational system, along with developmental inputs and vast variety of new openings resulting therefrom, the upper sections of the society have been the main beneficiaries and thereby more qualified and more suited to meet the requirements of newer forms of leadership.

Second, the socio-economic background of leaders in different political parties shows that the parties have relied

heavily on traditional institutions—particularly, castes—in their bid to recruit more and more people in politics. They have thereby reinforced traditional institutions instead of weakening them. As a result, many of the orientations and behaviour patterns associated with the caste system filter into modern politics. Apart from being a crucial factor in the recruitment of leaders, the socio-economic status also influences career mobility of leaders. Some parties do engage in mobilizing people from hitherto unmobilized sections of the society, but because of their minor and regional character, they have not made a greater impact in this regard.

Where a handful of leaders, drawn mainly from a narrow social base, continue to wield monopoly of power and make it difficult for others to enter relationship rank it is not surprising that a vast section of people begin to suffer from a sense of powerlessness. This may ultimately lead the system to a point where general population turns out to be apathetic and lose faith in the system, or may resort to extra-constitutional means to acquire power. Howsoever slow this process may be, both these conditions are inconducive to a smooth and successful functioning of democratic system.

What is thus reflected bring out an interesting commentary on the nature and character of Indian leadership that exists and the shape it may take in the future. The process of recruitment and promotional opportunities available to the cross-section of leadership are unduly biased in favour of those belonging to upper segments of society. This leads us to infer that the process of elimination controlling access to higher positions of national level leadership operates at two levels. First, at the grass-root level where we find the majority recruitments being made from the 'pool of eligibles' and the quick promotions of cooped leaders to higher positions of power in the party as well as legislative bodies, the chances of attaining these positions once again get restricted to those who either belong to higher socio-economic status or enjoy favours from higher-ups in their party. Although, the process may seem to be very natural but its implications are far-reaching.

It hampers the basic spirit of representative system on the one hand and discourages all those well-meaning people who enter politics with an honest sense of service but lack other 'qualifications' such as belonging to the 'pool of eligibles' or manipulative skill to rise higher without rising through the ranks—a rampant feature of present day politics. Moreover, the elimination of those grass-root leaders who were able to get entry into politics because of the openness of grass-root politics but were denied further promotion adds still another dimension to skewedness of representation of leaders at the state and national levels. This means a growing divorce between public sentiments and public policy.

Third, notwithstanding the inclination towards authoritarianism on the part of a small group of leaders, there is generally a liberal trend with respect to other values. For example, in a polity where the sense of nationhood in its modern meaning does not have a very long tradition, commitment to national goals and objectives among Indian leaders is quite indicative of their national perspective. Similarly, adherence to a consensual political order and harmony is reinforced by the leaders' overwhelming support to legislative and not to direct-action radicalism. That is, the power elites, even though they are drawn only from a very narrow section of the society do not reflect an outlook that questions the primacy of the nation. They want to preserve social harmony but at the same time, they are well-inclined to bring socio-economic changes to better the lot of the indigent sections of the society. What is thus indicated is that the leadership can only support legislative radicalism and not the direct-action radicalism.

Fourth, despite a wide variety of constraints and conflicts a multi-party system is generally exposed to, there exists a fair amount of agreement among leaders and parties on broader principles of the functioning of the system. That is, although parties in India represent a wide spectrum of ideologies and appear to be diametrically opposed to each other on several issues, they share, more or less, common values, and express

almost an identical view as far as the viability of the present political system is concerned. Such an overwhelming acceptance of the validity of the present political system broadly signifies that the conflict, whether it is 'within the regime' or 'concerning the regime,' would, in all probability, be resolved within the constitutional framework.

Fifth, there is a good deal of concordance between the views of leaders and people they represent. Even if the people's views are just a reflection of what the leaders make them to believe or understand, the fact remains that this concordance between leaders and the people enables the former to mobilize public opinion, on the one hand, and allows the latter to appreciate and endorse their leaders' perspectives, on the other. And both put together provide favourable conditions for the substance of the democratic system.

And finally, the political parties seem to have emerged as one of the potent democratizing forces in Indian polity. Though the leaders have more or less been recruited from similar socio-economic backgrounds, the differences in their attitudes clearly demonstrate the influence of their differential socialization patterns both outside and within their respective parties.

## Appendix I

(List of Relevant Questions from the  
Main Questionnaire)\*

1. (1) How old were you when you first became interested in politics and public affairs ?
2. (2) Have you worked in politics rather continuously since you first became active in politics or not ?  
Yes  
No
3. (2a) When did you first start working for your present party ? (Probe for year)  
Since the year.....
4. (2b) Have you worked for any other party or parties in the past ? (If yes) which parties and when ?

Parties	year
—	From—To
—	— —
5. (2c) Would you tell me what positions you hold now and have held in the past in party work ? Let us

- Figures in parenthesis represent question numbers in the main Questionnaire and references in the text are made to these numbers.

begin with the positions you hold now. (AFTER RECORDING PRESENT POSITION(S) ASK) What about the positions you held in the past ?

Position	Level	Party	Year
			From—To

6. (3) Now I would also like to know the legislative and governmental positions you hold now and have held in the past, including positions in Panchayati Raj bodies and Municipalities. Let us begin with the positions you hold now. (AFTER RECORDING PRESENT POSITION(S) ASK) What about the positions you held in the past ?

Position	Level of Government	Year
		From—To

7. (4) Could you tell us what was it that made you enter politics and public affairs ?

8. (7) Now talking about your family, was your father interested in politics and public affairs ?

Yes

No

IF YES

9. (7a) Did he support any party ? (If yes) which party ?

10. (7b) Were there any other members of your family who were interested in politics and public affairs ?

Yes

No

IF YES

11. (7c) Did they support any party ? (If yes) which party ?  
 WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO KNOW OWN OPINION ON SOME OF THE ISSUES THAT ARE BEING DEBATED ALL OVER THE COUNTRY.

12. (20) How about the question of control on economy—do you think the government should exercise greater control over industries, trade and agriculture than at present, or should it exercise less controls, or keep the controls as they are?

Greater

Same

Less

13. (21) What do you think of Bank Nationalization? Do you think it was proper for the government to take over banks or should they have been left as they were?

Proper

Left as they were

Other (specify)

14. (22) Some people say that the government should pass legislation so that people are not allowed to own and possess large amount of land and property. Others say that people should be allowed to own as much land and property as they can acquire—what would you say?

Should government limit ownership of property, or

Government should not limit ownership of property

Other (specify)

15. (23) Now I would like to talk about the relationship between the Central Government and the State Government. Some people have been asking for more powers for the State Government. Other people are for giving more powers to the Central Government. What do you think—should the states be given more powers, or should the Central



Government have more powers ?

State government

more powers

No change

Central government

more powers

Other (specify)

16. (24) There are large states and small states in our country. Some people have argued that for better government large states should be divided into smaller states. Others feel that this is not desirable. How do you feel—is it desirable to have smaller and more numerous states or should the large states remain as they are ?

Smaller states desirable

States remain as they are

Other (specify)

17. (26) Over the last few years there have been many demonstrations, strikes, gheraos etc. in our country. Some people say such actions are a proper way of making those in authority pay attention to the grievances and demands of the people, others say that these actions are not a proper way. How about you ? Would you say these actions are a proper way of drawing attention to peoples' grievances and demands or not a proper way ?

Proper

Not proper

Other (specify)

18. (27) Some political leaders and parties have been advocating that poor people with no land and property should occupy a part of land and property of those who have large amount of land and property. Do you approve of this or do you disapprove ?

Approve

Disapprove

Other (specify,

19. (39) Some people say that democratic rights should be curbed if they come in the way of rapid economic development. Others say that democratic rights should not be curbed even if economic development is slowed down. What would you say ?
- Curb rights  
Not curb rights  
Other (specify)
20. (41) Talking of economic development some people say that having political parties and elections have been a help in the achievement of these goals. Others say that they have been a hinderance. What would you say--have parties and elections been a help or a hinderance in the economic development of the country ?
- Help  
Hinderance  
Other (specify)
21. (47) I would like to know your views about Panchayati Raj. Some people say that it should be given more powers and functions than it has today. Others say that its powers and functions should be maintained as they are. Still others say that giving them the powers and functions they have, was not a right thing, and therefore, their powers should be curtailed. What do you think ?
- More powers  
Maintain present powers  
Curtail powers
22. (61) Do you think that the government in this country can be run better if there were no parties, assemblies and elections ?
- Yes      No  
Other (specify)

23. (62) Some people say that elections are proper means to decide (determine) who should govern the country. Others say that leaders should not be elected but selected on the basis of their merit, that is, their education, experience and competence. How about you ? Do you think leaders should be elected as now, or selected on the basis of their merit ?

Elected as now

Selected on merit

D K.

Qualified answers

(Record exact answer)

24. (64) There is lot of talk these days about people and parties belonging to the left, right or centre in terms of idalogy. How about you : where would you put yourself, on the extreme left, left, centre, right or extreme right ?

Extreme left

Left

Centre,

Right

Extreme right

#### DON'T ASK INDEPENDENTS

25. (64a) How about your party ? Where would you put it ?

Extreme left

Left

Centre

Right

Extreme right

26. (65) Here are some statements about problems that leaders face in the course of their work. I will

read the statements one by one. You please tell me how much do you agree or disagree with each—that is do you strongly agree, just agree, disagree or strongly disagree? Let us take the first statement :

27. (65.1) National goals should always receive priority over the requirements of the local area.
- Strongly agree  
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree
28. (65.2) A good leader should refrain from making proposals that divide the people even if these are important for the area.
- Strongly agree  
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree
29. (65.3) Decision-making activity need not be the concern of all the people in the area.
- Strongly agree  
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree
30. (65.4) In case of conflict the needs of the local area should receive preference over national objectives.
- Strongly agree      Disagree  
Agree              Strongly disagree
31. (65.5) Any decision that threatens to alienate a sector or group in the area should be postponed.
- Strongly agree  
Agree  
Disagree  
Strongly disagree

32. (65.6) Participation of the people is not necessary if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted and competent leaders.
- Strongly agree
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree
33. (65.7) We should not worry so much about national problems when we have so many in our own area.
- Strongly agree
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree
34. (65.8) Perceiving harmony in the area should be considered more important than the achievement of programmes for the area.
- Strongly agree
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree
35. (65.9) Participation of all the citizens in decision-making is necessary even if it takes a lot of time and expenditure.
- Strongly agree
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree
36. (65.10) Although national affairs are important, people here should first worry about the problems of their own area.
- Strongly agree
  - Agree
  - Disagree
  - Strongly disagree

37. (65.11) If there is disagreement about a programme, a leader should be willing to give it up.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

38. (65.12) Allowing many people to have their say in the matters of the area will only interfere with getting things done.

Strongly agree

Agree

Disagree

Strongly disagree

#### BACKGROUND DATA

39. (1) Sex (observation)  
Male  
Female
40. (2) Age (years)
41. (3) Religion
42. (4) What is your caste ?
43. (6) What is the highest level of education you reached ?
44. (7) Apart from your political position what is your occupation now ?
45. (7a) (If retired) what was your occupation most of your life ?
46. (10) What was the highest level of education your father reached ?

47. (11) Where have you lived most of your life—in towns or villages ?
48. (12) Where is your residence now ?  
Rural  
Urban
49. (14) How much land is owned by you and your household ?  
Record in acres
50. (16) What is the monthly income of the whole household, including your income ?

## *Appendix II*

### **The Sample and the Respondents**

The data on which the present study is based was collected for a more general study of the 1971 general election of the electoral behaviour conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. Its main focus was the analysis of electoral behaviour. Elite study was part of the same, though it was not the central concern. Since the main concern of the study was to obtain a national representative sample of the electorate it was decided to select 15 percent parliamentary constituencies, from each state. Having selected the parliamentary constituencies, two assembly constituencies from each unit were chosen. While selecting these units random sampling procedure was used.

Table II.1 gives the distribution of the total number of parliamentary constituencies in each state and number of parliamentary and assembly constituencies selected for the study.



**TABLE II-1**  
**Total Number of Parliamentary Constituencies and**  
**Sampled Constituencies by State**

<i>Sl. No.</i>	<i>Name of the State</i>	<i>Total No. of Parl. Constituency</i>	<i>No. of Parl. Const. selected</i>	<i>No. of Assemb. Const. selected</i>
1.	Andhra Pradesh	41	6	12
2.	Assam	14	2	4
3.	Bihar	53	1	16
4.	Gujarat	24	4	8
5.	Haryana	9	2	4
6.	Kerala	19	3	6
7.	Madhya Pradesh	37	5	10
8.	Tamil Nadu	39	6	12
9.	Maharashtra	45	7	14
10.	Karnataka	27	4	8
11.	Orissa	20	3	6
12.	Punjab	13	2	4
13.	Rajasthan	23	3	6
14.	Uttar Pradesh	85	13	26
15.	West Bengal	40	6	12
16.	Jammu & Kashmir	6	1	2
17.	Himachal Pradesh	4	1	2
18.	Union Territories	18	3	6
<b>Total</b>		<b>517</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>158</b>

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 2. Chief Whip  | 4 |
| (if for parties other than ruling party there was no chief whip, deputy leader was taken. If there was no deputy leader was taken. If there was no deputy leader, legislative party secretary was interviewed) |   |

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 16
 

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II. <i>Parliamentary Constituency Level</i>	<i>Total</i>
---	--------------

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. Winning Candidate                           | 1 |
| 2. Runner-up Candidate                         | 1 |
| 3. Campaign Manager of the Winning Candidate   | 1 |
| 4. Campaign Manager of the Runner-up Candidate | 1 |

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 4
 

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(For choosing the campaign manager, we asked the Candidates who their campaign manager was. If Candidate mentioned more than one campaign manager, we asked him to indicate the most important of the two and interviewed him)

III. <i>District Level</i>	<i>Total</i>
----------------------------	--------------

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1. President of the Party of Winning Candidate.       | 1 |
| 2. President of the Party of the Runner-up Candidate. | 1 |

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 3. Secretary of the Party of Winning Candidate.  | 1 |
| 4. Secretary of the Party of Runner-up Candidate | 1 |

(If Winning candidate or the Runner-up candidate was an Independent supported by a single party, the President and Secretary of the party supporting him were interviewed. If winning candidate or the Runner-up was an Independent supported by an alliance of parties, the president and secretary of the most important party of the alliance at the District level were interviewed. If one of the two candidates was an Independent who was not supported by any party or alliance, no party officials were interviewed on his behalf. In case where the two Assembly Constituencies in the sample fall in two different Districts, the party officials listed above —i.e. Nos. 1 to 4— were interviewed for both the District.)

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 5. President of the Zilla Parishad, Zilla Panchayat or District Board | 1 |
| 6. Chairman of the District Cooperative Bank                          | 1 |

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6

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(In case the two Assembly Constituencies in our sample falling in two different Districts, Nos. 5 and 6 from both the Districts were interviewed)

IV. <i>Assembly Level</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. Sitting MLAs for the two Assembly Constituencies in our sample	2
	<hr/> 2
Total number of positions to be interviewed	<hr/> 28

This is all about selection of different leadership positions at various levels of government and parties. As far as actual number of interviewed positions are concerned they are far less than what should have been. The lower level of completion rate would speak for difficulties involved in survey research, particularly when it comes to an elite survey. Table II.2 summarises the information regarding interviews completed in respect of different sample positions in different states.

As can be gleaned from the above table, in Gujarat except the winning parliamentary candidates none of the other positions have been interviewed. This has caused inconvenience and introduced imbalance in the representative character of our national sample. However, this is not typical of a secondary data analysis and one has to accept its limitation, especially reflected in data already collected. As regards party break-ups of different leadership positions in our sample they are being presented in Table II.3.

One thing that must also be made clear at this stage is that political parties need to be regrouped for making our discussion more meaningful. To do so, except the SSP and PSP—the twin parties which are clubbed together—we have treated all the national parties (*viz.* Congress, Congress (O), Swatantra, Jana Sangh, CPI, and the CPM) as separate individual categories. For reasons of ideological similarity and insignificant number of cases belonging to parties like Forward Block, Indian Socialist Party (ISP), Peasants and workers' Party (PWP), and Kerala Socialist Party (KSP), these have been clubbed with the SSP and the PSP parties. All splinter groups which came out of the Congress Party at one

TABLE II-2  
State and Position-Vise Distribution of Completed Interviews

Position	State Party President	State Party Secretary	Legislative Leader	Chief Whip	Zila Parishad President	District Cooperative Bank Chairman	Winning Party District President	Runner-up Party District President	Winning Party District Secretary	Runner-up Party District Secretary	MLA	Winning Candidate	Runner-up Candidate	Campaigner Winning Candidate	Campaigner Runner-up Candidate	Total Number of Positions Interviewed
	01	02	08	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Andhra Pradesh	3	3	3	3	5	6	5	3	5	4	9	6	4	5	6	70
2. Assam	2	3	3	3	—	1	2	—	2	1	3	2	1	2	1	26
3. Bihar	3	3	3	4	1	8	6	5	8	8	15	8	6	5	6	89
4. Gujarat	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	4
5. Haryana	3	3	1	1	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	1	1	2	2	33
6. Himachal Pradesh	3	3	3	3	2	1	2	2	2	2	—	1	1	1	1	27
7. Jammu & Kashmir	1	1	—	—	—	—	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	14

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
8. Kerala	1	3	2	3	—	3	1	1	3	4	4	2	3	3	1	34
9. Madhya Pradesh	—	1	—	—	—	2	3	3	3	3	2	4	2	2	3	28
10. Maharashtra	1	2	—	—	7	5	6	4	5	6	11	4	4	6	5	66
11. Karnataka	3	3	3	3	—	3	4	2	4	4	5	3	3	2	4	46
12. Orissa	4	4	3	2	—	2	3	2	4	3	3	3	2	3	3	41
13. Punjab	2	3	2	3	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	—	2	1	26
14. Rajasthan	2	4	3	3	4	1	3	3	3	4	5	2	2	2	1	42
15. Tamilnadu	2	3	3	4	—	5	6	6	4	6	9	5	5	4	3	65
16. Uttar Pradesh	2	4	2	2	—	9	11	11	11	12	23	12	10	13	8	130
17. West Bengal	2	3	3	2	1	3	3	3	2	2	7	5	3	1	3	43
18. Delhi	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	2	—	—	9
19. Pondicherry	2	4	3	2	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	1	1	17
Total	38	52	37	38	24	53	62	50	63	66	104	67	51	55	50	810

TABLE II-3  
Party and Position-wise Distribution of Respondents

Type of position interviewed	State Party President	State Party Secretary	Legislative Leader	Chief Whip	Zila Parishad President	District Cooperative Bank Chairman	Winning Party District President	Running-up Party District President	Winning Party District Secretary	Running-up Party District Secretary	MLA	Winning Candidate	Runner-up Candidate	Campaigner Winning Candidate	Campaigner Runner-up Candidate	Total Number of Positions Interviewed
Name of Party	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Congress (N)	10	14	4	9	22	25	46	10	44	12	53	43	12	39	9	352
Swatantra	4	5	5	4	—	2	—	6	1	7	8	1	4	1	1	49
Jana Sangh	5	5	6	5	—	—	2	13	3	15	4	3	11	2	12	86
CPI (M)	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	—	3	3	1	4	1	2	—	17
CPI	—	6	7	4	—	—	—	—	1	3	5	—	5	1	4	36
SSP	1	1	1	1	—	1	2	2	2	2	4	2	2	1	1	23
PSP	3	2	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	1	—	2	14

	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Congress (O)	8	9	5	4	2	13	1	12	1	14	5	2	6	1	10	93
BKD	2	2	2	—	—	—	—	2	—	2	4	—	2	—	2	18
DMK	—	2	—	2	—	4	3	—	2	—	7	2	—	2	—	24
Telangana Praja Samiti,	2	1	2	2	—	—	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	—	19
Utkal Congress	—	1	—	1	—	—	1	—	1	—	1	1	—	1	—	7
Bangla Congress,																
Jana Congress,																
Kerala Congress																
Akali Dal	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	—	—	1	6
Muslim League	1	1	1	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	—	7
Indian Socialist	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	1	2	2	1	—	—	1	11
Party, Kerala Socialist																
Party, Peasant and																
Workers' Party,																
Forward Block																
Vishal Haryana	1	1	—	—	—	1	2	—	2	—	2	1	—	1	—	11
Other Parties	1	1	2	1	—	—	—	2	—	1	2	—	1	—	3	14
Independent	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	1	3	3	1	1	12
Non-partymen	—	—	—	1	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	1	2	1	3	11
Total	38	52	37	38	24	53	62	50	63	66	104	67	51	55	50	810



time or the other (viz., Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD), Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS), Utkal Congress, Bangla Congress, Kerala Congress and the Vishal Haryana Party (VHP) have been treated as one group and are labelled as Splinter Congress Parties. The Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK) has been treated as an individual category and the rest of the parties have been put together and labelled as Other Parties. And finally, all those who contested the 1971 election as Independents or held chairmanship of Zilla Parishad or Cooperative Bank but did not belong to any party have been treated as non-partymen. The neat categories which have quite often been used throughout the discussion are the following :

1. Congress
2. Congress (O)
3. Swatantra
4. Jana Sangh
5. CPI
6. CPM
7. Socialists (SSP, PSP, Forward Block, KSP, PWP and ISP)
8. DMK
9. Splinter Congress (BKD, Telangana Praja Samiti, Utkal Congress, Bangla Congress, Jana Congress, Kerala Congress and Vishal Haryana Party).
10. Other Parties (Akali Dal, Muslim League and the rest.)
11. Non-partymen.

TABLE 1  
Educational Level by Year of Entry into First Party

<i>Year of Entry</i>	<i>1947 or before</i>	<i>1948-52</i>	<i>1953-62</i>	<i>1963-71</i>	<i>Never in Party</i>	<i>N.A.</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>Level of Education</i>							
Upto Primary School	7.6	2.6	3.2	4.3	9.1	—	5.5
High school not completed	12.8	11.8	5.8	1.4	9.1	12.5	10.2
High School	22.1	15.1	15.6	7.2	9.1	12.5	18.1
College but no degree	15.0	13.8	7.8	13.0	9.1	12.5	13.2
Degree and above	42.5	56.6	67.6	73.9	63.6	62.5	53.0
Total	407	152	154	69	11	8	810
N= %	(50.8)	(19.0)	(19.2)	(8.6)	(1.4)	(1.0)	(100.0)

TABLE 2  
Distribution of Leaders Having Relatives in Politics by their Year of Interest in Politics

<i>Year of Interest</i>	<i>Leaders Having Relatives in Politics (in %)</i>	<i>No. of Cases</i>
Pre-independence period	60.2	528 (65.2)
From 1948 to 1952	67.9	109 (13.5)
From 1953 to 1962	67.2	125 (15.4)
1963 and after	68.2	44 (5.4)
Year of Interest N.A.	75.0	4 (0.5)
Total	509	810
N=		
%	62.8	100.0

TABLE 3

**Motivation for Entry Into Politics by Periods of Entry Into First Party**  
(in %)

<i>Year of Joining First Party</i>	<i>1947 and 1948-52 Before</i>			<i>1953-62 1963 and after</i>			<i>N.A. Total</i>
<i>Motivations</i>							
Primordial pressure and ties	6.8	9.7	11.0	13.0	18.2	—	71
Organizational links and involvement in agitations and movements other than Freedom Movement	9.7	7.1	12.3	1.4	—	—	71
Freedom Movement	56.5	15.5	7.8	4.3	9.1	12.5	274
Personal inclinations and dispositions	11.1	19.4	20.8	36.3	9.1	12.5	135
Concern for socio-economic conditions of the people, society and group(s)	12.1	39.4	40.3	36.3	36.3	75.0	208
Ideological consideration and concern for specific policies and programmes	3.4	7.7	6.5	8.7	18.2	—	44
Not ascertained	0.3	1.3	1.3	—	9.1	—	7
Total	413	155	154	69	11	8	810
N= %	51.0	19.1	19.0	8.5	1.4	1.0	100.0

TABLE 4  
Means, SDs, Factor Loadings, and Communalities of Indicators of Authoritarianism  
 (First Principal Component Factors, with Iterations)

<i>Indicators</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Factor Loading</i>	<i>Community</i>
Decision need not be by all	2.57	.77	788	.57	.33
Decision by Competent Leaders	2.77	.80	789	.51	.26
Decision require citizen-participation	2.34	.82	785	.49	.24
People's participation in decision-making is an interference	2.53	.76	786	.50	.25

Variance explained 45 per cent

TABLE 5  
Means, SDs, Factor Loadings, and Communalities of Indicators of Social-Harmony  
(First Principal Component Factors, with Iterations)

INDICATORS	Mean	S D	N	Factor Loading	Communality
Leaders should refrain from making divisive proposals	2.95	.83	790	.26	.07
Decisions threatening alienation should be postponed	2.88	.74	771	.53	.28
Harmony is more important than programme achievement	2.70	.74	777	.49	.24
In case of dis-agreement a leader should give-up a programme.	2.67	.73	764	.32	.10

Variance explained 37 per cent.

TABLE 6  
Means, SDs, Factor Loadings, and Communalities of Indicators of National Commitment  
(First Principal Component Factors, with Iterations)

INDICATORS	Mean	S D	N	Factor Loading	Communality
National goals receive priority over local needs	3.26	.69	780	.43	.18
In case of conflict local needs should be preferred over national objectives	2.74	.82	782	.51	.26
With so many local problems we should not worry about national problems	2.95	.67	782	.67	.45
National affairs are important but people should worry about their own community	2.65	.75	772	.63	.40
Variance explained 49 per cent.					

TABLE 7  
Means, SDs, Factor Loadings, and Communality of Indicators of Radicalism  
(Rotated Factor Solutions)

INDICATORS	Mean	SD	N	Factor Pattern		Factor Loading		Communality
				Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 1	Factor 2	
Degree of Control on Economy	.57	.49	795	-.47	.24	.53	.37	.37
Bank Nationalization	.68	.47	803	-.61	.02	.61	.19	.38
Ceiling on land and property	.90	.73	810	-.18	-.03	.17	.02	.03
Strikes, Gheraos and Demonstration are proper	.54	.50	806	.11	.65	.07	.62	.40
Direct take-over of land and property of rich	.20	.40	809	-.17	.38	.27	.42	.21

Variance explained 54 per cent. And Correlation between factors is .27



## *Appendix IV*

1. In order to examine the relative influence of socio-economic status (SES) and years of experience in party to get a position in party organization and government, we tabulate SES against the years spent in party and party positions respectively to get entry into party organization at various levels and into the State Legislatures and the Parliament. The underlying assumption behind this is that the positions in party organization and a place in the State Legislatures and in the Parliament are given to the members of party as reward for their services rendered to the party. Similarly, it is also assumed that the leaders with better SES and other requisites that go with SES enjoy greater chances of being rewarded as against their counterparts who may be a little more experienced but are low on the SES.

Proceeding on the basis of this assumption, we first constructed a scale of SES by using four indicators viz., Respondent's education, his household's monthly income, the size of family land holdings, and his caste status. Following the direction from low to high a score of 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 was assigned to each respondent on all the four indicators. 'Doubtful' and 'not ascertained' cases were treated as missing values and were thrown out of the scale. Assignment of scores was done in the following manner :

## Indicator and label

<i>Score</i>	<i>Education</i>	<i>Income</i>	<i>Land</i>	<i>Caste</i>
1.	Upto primary school	upto Rs. 300	upto 5 acres	Sheduled Castes & Tribes
2.	High school not completed	Rs. 301-500	6-10 acres	Low castes
3.	High School	Rs. 501-700	11-20 acres	Muslim & other religious groups.
4.	College no degree	Rs. 701-1000	21-35 acres	Middle castes
5.	Degree and above	Rs. 1000 and above	36 acres and more	Upper castes and Brahmins

Having assigned the score to each of the indicators a composite index was generated by summing individual scores on all the four items. The summated score thus generated ranged from a minimum of 4 to a maximum of 20. For the purpose of our analysis the summated score was further divided into three categories: Low (score ranging between 4 to 13), Middle (score ranging between 14 to 16), and High (score ranging between 17 to 20). The distribution thus obtained was; Low-270 cases, Middle-238, and High-208. The rests i.e. 94 cases were thrown out for the lack of information on one item or the other.

Secondly, we have tried to see the distribution of leaders in different categories of experience in the party, i.e. number of years spent prior to attaining a position in the party at various levels of organizational network. In this we covered all levels of party organization right from the local level—village and town levels—to national level. Since the present sample deals with leaders at assembly constituency level and above, the position holders at levels lower than the district are very few. Similar is the case with the national level. Keeping statistical considerations in mind we, therefore, decided to regroup the levels into two : one, district level and below, and, two, state and national levels. This is about organizational positions. As far as governmental positions are concerned, we have included memberships in the State Legislature and the Parliament. And thus, with what experience one acquires these positions in the party and in the government and what role the SES plays in it are the questions for which explanations are sought through the data presented in table 3.11 in the text.

2. All the values except radicalism consist of four items each. And all items therein have four alternate answer categories ranging between 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' with 'agree' and 'disagree' in the middle. Keeping unidimensionality of all the items within a value, each answer category was assigned a score of 1, 2, 3 or 4 depending upon the direction of the question. That is, as we have already seen that some of the items forming part of the same value-scale were worded in an opposite direction, we re-assigned a relevant score to each of the answer categories so that they become unidirectional. Having assigned score to each of the answer categories of the four items in each value a composite index was then generated by summing individual scores on the four items. Of course, 'do not know' and/or 'not ascertained' type of answers were treated as missing values and therefore eliminated. The summated score thus generated ranged from a minimum scores of 4 to a maximum of 16. For the purposes of our analysis, however, the index was further divided into three categories : high (scores ranging between 12 and 16), middle (score ranging between 10 and 11), and low (score

ranging between 4 and 9.)<sup>1</sup> As far as radicalism index is concerned, it has five items in it. The questions included to measure radicalism in fact tap two dimensions of radicalism i.e. 'Legislative' and 'Direct action' radicalism.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly separate scales were generated by using first three items to measure direct action radicalism (refer to table 4.4 in the text). Following the procedure as described in the case of other values the summated scores for both the types were generated. In the case of legislative radicalism the score ranged between a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 6. While categorizing further a score of 6 becomes high, 5 becomes middle, and 3 and 4 become low. Similarly, in the case of direct action radicalism which consists of only two items with dichotomous answer categories the maximum score of 4 automatically becomes high, a score of 3 becomes middle and 2 becomes low.

1. While deciding about the cut off points for high middle and low categories, we were mainly guided by distribution of cases in each range.
2. Splitting the items into two dimensions is based on principal components analysis. For further details see, Appendix III, table 7 and see also Sheth, *op. cit.*

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